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„[Im Rahmen großer Unsicherheit können Entscheidungen] nur 
auf die animalischen Instinkte zurückgeführt werden – auf einen 
plötzlichen Anstoß zur Tätigkeit, statt zur Untätigkeit, und nicht 
auf den gewogenen Durchschnitt quantitativer Vorteile, 
multipliziert mit quantitativen Wahrscheinlichkeiten.“ 
John Maynard Keynes, Allgemeine Theorie der Beschäftigung, des 
Zinses und des Geldes (2006), S. 137 
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I. The Emotion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„So sind wir nun einmal gemacht; wir überlegen nicht; 
wo wir fühlen, fühlen wir einfach.“ 
Mark Twain, Ein Yankee aus Connecticut am Hofe König 
Arthurs,  
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There are many theories which are about emotion and we 
will not discuss all of them. Among others one can 
distinguish behavioural, physiological, cognitive and 
ambitious theories. (Many can be found in Strongman 
(2003)) 
Theories of emotion, like the James-Lange-theory or the 
Cannon-Bard-theory, illuminate the connection between 
physiological and psychological aspects of emotion. The 
appraisal theory closes the gap between the stimulus and 
the resulting excitement. According to Magda Arnold this 
appraisal is subconscious and it weighs potential utility 
and damage, and the emotion is a felt tendency towards a 
subject or away from a subject (Arnold, 1960). LeDoux 
(1998) judges this theory as plausible, but finds fault 
with the tendency to introspection because from his point 
of view this doesn’t lead to reliable results.  
Schachter’s (1970) two-factor theory of emotion 
emphasizes the interaction between physiological arousal 
and cognitive appraisal. Firstly we get aroused and 
afterwards we ask what have brought this state about.  
Lazarus’s (1991a) theory is about appraisal and coping. 
We search for stimuli and appraise them and this 
produces emotional response. Moreover because the 
stimuli often change the emotional reactions alter. The 
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coping process can be distinguished into two sorts. 
Firstly by direct action, secondly by reappraisal. There 
are three primary appraisals, goal relevance, goal 
congruency and ego-involvement. The three secondary 
appraisals are concerned with blame or credit, the 
potential to cope and future expectations. The appraisal 
of the two sets of antecedent variables- personality and 
environmental- are integrated into a related meaning. If 
there is harm or benefit this leads to an innate action 
tendency. 
Ellsworth’s theory (1991) is about feelings that occur as a 
result of a combination of appraisals. The emotional 
expressions from this point of view are similar if the 
appraisal is similar, but differs because the appraisal will 
not be identical. Moreover emotion might alter the 
cognition, the appraisal of a predisposed angry man will  
be different from the appraisal of a predisposed sad man.  
Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) emphasize individual 
goals and plans and a social aspect in form of mutual 
goals. Oatley and Johnson-Laird distinguish the two 
types of communication, propositional (symbolic and 
denotative) and non-propositional (simple and causal). 
Emotional signals that are non-propositional lead to a 
mode in which a goal becomes the most important until it 
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is satisfied or abandoned. There are the following 
universal human emotion modes: happiness, sadness, 
anxiety, anger, disgust. In adults a conscious evaluation 
of planning is usually involved if there is an emotion, this 
leading to voluntary action. Moreover emotions 
coordinate the modular system and we can find emotions 
when plans are interrupted, allowing transitions to new 
aspects of plans. “Social interaction depends on dealing 
with mutual plans in which cognitive systems can 
cooperate.” In the case of complex emotions one mode 
leads to another after various appraisals. “So adult 
emotion has as an integral part the generation of self-
conscioussness when a social plan becomes problematic.” 
The appraisal theory neglects the difference between 
emotion and cognition. So this cognitive appraisal theory 
was questioned. A study of Lazarus and McCleary (1951) 
showed that the subconscious presentation of emotional 
conditioned stimuli in contrast to neutral stimuli 
activated the autonomous nervous system. Zajonc shows 
that it’s possible to have preferences without to infer 
(Zajonc 1980). Some studies are based on the 
psychological effect of mere presentation. If you show 
people patterns in a certain order and ask them if they 
prefer the new ones or the old ones, they prefer the old 
ones, only on basis of the presented order. The 
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subconscious presentation of words, patterns or numbers 
has the same effect. Because there are no reasons for the 
choice according to Zajonc a decision must be possible 
without the cognitive system. In the case of priming 
Murphy and Zajonc (1993) present for 5 milliseconds an 
activating stimulus with a certain emotional connotation, 
like happy or angry faces. Afterwards they present for 2 
seconds a letter. As you can guess the assessment 
depended on the emotional connotation (see also Bargh 
und Pietromonaco 1982; Strahan et al. 2002). From 
Zajonc’ point of view this hints at the idea that the affect 
precedes the cognition and that it’s independent of it. 
LeDoux (2010) argues that this must not be so, because 
the cognitive information processing could be 
subconscious and not independent. 
Rick und Loewenstein (2008) distinguish expected 
emotions and immediate emotions. The expected 
emotions are consistent with the consequential 
traditional economic model. The immediate emotions can 
be distinguished in integral emotions which can be 
experienced in the decision process and incidental 
emotions which have nothing to do with the decision.  
In the case of an uncertain decision the expected utility 
theory is the standard. Its asset integration assumption 
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was questioned by Markowitz (1952) and Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). Furthermore not realized results affect 
the realized outcomes in models of expected emotion (see 
Köszegi und Rabin (2006) or Mellers et al. (1997)). Or 
think about models which are about remorse (Loomes 
und Sugden 1982). Affective answers seem to be 
reference dependent, so that not only you have to think 
about the subjects in the foreground but also about their 
relationships with other subjects. Wilson und Gilbert 
(2003) show, that there is a difference between the 
expected emotion and the realized emotion (impact bias). 
The prediction referring to the valence work, also the 
specific emotions, but the statements about duration and 
intensity were wrong. You can find the reasons in Wilson 
and Gilbert (2003). An example for integral emotions is  
the study of Ariely und Loewenstein (2005), they find that 
sexual excitement influences the attitude towards risk, 
but not the risk perception. An example for incidental 
emotions is the study of Hirshleifer und Shumway (2003), 
which showed that there is a correlation between 
sunshine and returns on the stock market. While integral 
emotions can be build in the consequential framework 
the incidental emotions can’t.  
Because the work of Joseph LeDoux is of central 
importance for our approach we will now cite him: 
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“At the neural level, each emotional unit can be thought 
of as consisting of a set of inputs, an appraisal 
mechanism, and a set of outputs. But the appraisal 
mechanism also has the capacity to learn about stimuli 
that tend to be associated with and predictive of the 
occurrence of natural triggers. These we’ll call “learned 
triggers”. The place where a predator was seen last, or 
the sound it made when it was charging toward the prey 
are good examples. When the appraisal mechanism 
receives trigger inputs of either type, it unleashes certain 
patterns of response that have tended to be useful in 
dealing with situations that have routinely activated the 
appraisal mechanism in ancestral animals.” LeDoux 
(1998), p.127 
Our idea of emotion, as we will see in the next chapters, 
is that of integral emotions, which are about 
consequences and are experienced in the decision 
process.   
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II. Fear Conditioning 
 
 
 
 
 
„Vielleicht ist der Mensch das furchtsamste Wesen, da zu 
der elementaren Angst vor Freßfeinden und feindseligen 
Artgenossen intellektuell begründete Existenzängste 
hinzukommen.“  
Eibl-Eibesfeldt und Sutterlin (1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
The mechanism of fear was examined by LeDoux (1998) 
looking at the fear conditioning. The basis of fear 
conditioning is the classical conditioning according to 
Pavlow, which combines an unconditioned stimulus 
(meat) with a conditioned stimulus (an acoustic signal) 
and presented this association several times one after the 
other. The result was that the innate reaction of flow of 
spittle, which takes place automatically while showing 
the meat, could be observed also by only presenting the 
acoustic signal. The innate reaction becomes a 
conditioned reaction. If we look at the fear conditioning of 
rats, a cat acts as the unconditioned stimulus and an 
associated acoustical signal correspondents to the 
conditioned stimulus and the freezing of the rat the 
conditioned reaction. The freezing of the rat can be 
activated by both by the innate and the learned trigger. 
Through the emotional conditioning the animal gets 
enormous flexibility. The natural fear of the cat is 
transferred to the context (Blanchard und Blanchard 
1972), so the rat is able to react, while the dangerous 
stimulus does not yet appear. It’s valid that „the danger 
predicted by these learned trigger stimuli can be real  or 
imagined, concrete or abstract, allowing a great range of 
external (environmental) and internal (mental) conditions 
to serve as conditioned stimulus.” LeDoux (1998), p.143. 
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Learning to avoid starts with the fear conditioning, 
followed by a reaction to reduce that fear. This reaction is 
neither an innate emotional action nor an arbitrary 
emotional action. 
For the association it suffices to present the 
unconditional and the conditional stimulus once. And 
this association seems very persistent (Gleitman und 
Holmes 1967). If several times the acoustical signal does 
not appear with the appearance of the cat, we can 
observe the “extinction” of the fear reaction, but the 
association still survives (LeDoux 1998). The problem of 
the “spontaneous relaxation” (Pavlow 1927) and the 
disastrous effect of burdened events, which can reinstate 
fear reactions (Cambell und Jaynes 1966; Bouton 1994) 
seem to be based on the above mentioned observation.  
LeDoux (1998) tried to find out, what lies between the 
conditioned auditory stimulus and the resulted fear 
reaction. He showed that the damage of the auditory 
cortex, which forms the end of information processing, 
has no consequence on the fear conditioning. The lesion 
of the next deeper level, the auditory Thalamus, prevents 
the fear conditioning entirely. Therefore the stimulus has 
to take an independent way from the cortex. Projections 
to four subcortical areas were found by retrograde 
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marking, of which the projection to the amygdala was 
decisive. Studies show that the amygdala was responsible 
for autonomous reactions like the freezing, the 
suppression of pain and the strengthening of reflexes in 
case of fear conditioning (LeDoux 1993; LeDoux 1995). 
By anterograde marking LeDoux showed that the 
auditory stimulus projected from the auditory Thalamus 
to the lateral core of the amygdala, which also gets 
information from the cortex and can therefore be 
interpreted as interface. According to LeDoux (1998): 
“The fact that emotional learning can be mediated by 
pathways that bypass the neocortex is intriguing, for it 
suggests that emotional responses can occur without the 
involvement of the higher processing systems of the 
brain, systems believed to be involved in thinking, 
reasoning, and consciousness”(LeDoux (1998), p.161). 
Moreover LeDoux (1998) shows that the processing from 
sensory Thalamus to amygdala is inaccurate. Jarrell et 
al. (1987) proved that two similar acoustical signals, from 
which only one was coupled with an electrical shock, 
both lead to fear reactions after damaging the auditory 
cortex, but with working auditory cortex only the actually 
coupled signal leads to fear reactions. So the auditory 
cortex prevents inappropriate reactions. LeDoux (1998) 
believes that the subcortical way would become stunted 
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when it does not pursue an important purpose. He is 
quite sure that fast reactions, although inaccurate, lead 
to decisive advantages. We find the following on page 165 
in LeDoux (1998): „From the point of view of survival, it is 
better to respond to potentially dangerous events as if 
they were in fact the real thing than to fail to respond. 
The cost of treating a stick as a snake is less, in the long 
run, than the cost of treating a snake of a stick.“ 
We believe that the context, a collection of stimuli, is 
represented in the Hippocampus. A damage of it leads to 
no more fear reaction, but the conditioned stimulus still 
does (Phillips und LeDoux 1992).  
LeDoux (1998) believes that the amygdala seems to be a 
hub in the wheel of fear, see p.168 and p.169: 
“The amygdala is like the hub of a wheel. It receives low-
level inputs from the sensory-specific regions of the 
thalamus, higher level information from the sensory 
specific cortex, and still higher (sensory independent) 
information about the general situation from the 
hippocampal formation. Through such connections, the 
amygdala is able to process the emotional significance of 
individual stimuli as well as complex situations. The 
amygdala is, in essence, involved in the appraisal of 
emotional meaning.” 
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The results of experiments with animals can be 
transferred on humans, because we are, as LeDoux 
(1998) calls it on page 174, “emotional lizards”. Although 
the behavior of reptiles, birds and mammals is different 
in the case of danger, the neural basis is the same. For 
instance Bechara et al. (1995) observed that a woman 
with a damaged amygdala does show impaired fear 
conditioning.  
LeDoux (1998) distinguishes two learning systems, which 
are connected with emotional memories: The declarative 
resp. explicit memory (conscious “memory of emotion”) 
and the implicit memory (subconscious “emotional 
memory”). An explicit emotional memory arises, when 
neutral explicit memories are associated with emotional 
reactions in the working memory. A patient of Claparede 
(1911) had a damaged memory, so that she couldn’t form 
new memories. Once while greeting her, the doctor pricks 
her with a needle. The next time the patient refused the 
handshake. So the doctor became a learned trigger of a 
fear reaction based on the implicit memory.   
The explicit memory of an emotional situation is 
attributed to the Hippocampus and adjacent cortex. The 
emotional fear memory is associated with the amygdala. 
Because the explicit memory seems to be more forgetful 
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than the implicit, stimuli, which are subconsciously 
perceived could generate fear, which can’t be explained. 
Whereas the answers on the reversal of a conditioning in 
the orbifrontal Cortex change fast and flexible, we can 
observe inflexibility in the ventral amygdala, so Morris 
and Dolan (2004) argue that there are persistent 
„memories“ of the original conditioning.      
In case of stress our kidney pours out a steroidhormone 
(McEwen und Sapolsky, 1995) to activate energy 
reserves. Increasing stress leads to a situation in which 
the amygdala becomes more active and fear conditioning 
becomes more and more effective (Servatius und Shors, 
1994). Extinct or weak conditioned fear reactions can be 
reinforced in the case of stress. 
Finally LeDoux (1998) concludes on page 266: 
“The ability to rapidly form memories of stimuli 
associated with danger, to hold on to them for long 
periods of time (perhaps eternally), and use them 
automatically when similar situations occur in the future 
is one of the brain’s most powerful and efficient learning 
and memory functions. But this incredible luxury is 
costly. We sometimes, perhaps all too often, develop fears 
and anxieties about things that we would just as well not 
have. What is so useful about being afraid of heights or 
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elevators or certain foods or means of travel. While there 
are risks associated with each of these things, the 
chances of them causing harm are usually relatively 
small. We have more fears than we need, and it seems 
that our utterly efficient fear conditioning system, 
combined with an extremely powerful ability to think 
about our fears and an inability to control them, is 
probably at fault.”   
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III. The Hypothesis of Somatic Markers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Die Vernunft ist nur Sklave der Affekte und soll es sein; 
sie darf niemals eine andere Funktion beanspruchen, als 
die, denselben zu dienen und zu gehorchen.“ 
David Hume, Ein Traktat über die menschliche Natur 
(1978), S.153 
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After LeDoux (1998), who mainly dealt with the 
neurological base of fear in animals, we turn towards 
humans, looking at the somatic marker hypothesis by 
Antonio R. Damasio (1994).    
To decide one has to incorporate knowledge of the actual 
situation, the possible choices and the consequences, so 
according to Damasio (1994) one needs beside logical 
inferences also emotions. Especially when deciding 
personal or social questions, think of keeping one’s job or 
one’s status. 
The theory of Damasio (1994) is mainly based on the 
observation of patients, whose prefrontal Cortex was 
damaged. For instance the case Phineas P. Gage. He was 
in 1848 foreman of the Rutland & Burlington Railroad, 
until an accident changed everything. A rod perforated 
parts of his brain. Surprisingly he survived and did not 
show any inabilities to move, feel, hear and see. But his 
personality changed radically. He became moody, 
disrespectful and impatient in social interactions. Gage 
lost his ability to decide in a favorable manner. Modern 
methods made it possible to reconstruct the damages of 
his brain (Damasio et al. 1994). We can observe damages 
of the prefrontal Cortex, above all the ventral and medial 
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surfaces of both sides of his brain, but not the lateral 
area. 
A similar case Damasio (1994) presents is Elliot, a man 
between 30 and 40, exemplary, in good shape. The 
doctors have found a tumor in his brain. The removal of 
the tumor led to obvious changes in his personality. His 
feeling of duty towards his boss dwindled and he lost his 
ability to organize his time. He cared about unimportant 
tasks and ignored the main ones. Once again one 
observed a damage of his prefrontal Cortex, particularly 
in ventromedial area. Strangely enough although one 
observed a disturbed social behavior the tests on the 
ability to percept, the long term and short term memory, 
the ability to learn, speak and calculate don’t take effect. 
But the doctors observe an emotional distance towards 
the world and so Damasio (1994) concludes that possibly 
the ability to decide requires emotions. 
The examination of several other patients with prefrontal 
damage showed similar symptoms (Brickner 1934; Hebb 
und Penfield 1940). For animals Myers (1975) showed the 
same. Every time we observe a correlation of weak 
decisions and poor emotions. Other areas where we can 
study such a phenomenon are the somatosensing 
cortices (Anderson und Tranel 1989), structures of the 
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limbic system, like the amygdala (see Tranel und Hyman 
1990), and the Gyrus cinguli (z.B. Posner und Petersen 
1990).  
Damasio (1994) distinguishes primary and secondary 
emotions. The primary emotions, belonging to the limbic 
system, are released through certain innate stimuli, like 
noise, movement or pain and cause changes in the body. 
But only the conscious perception, the emotion, leads to 
complex cognitive strategies concerning the stimulus. The 
secondary emotions are the systematic association of 
subjects and situations with the primary feelings. The 
processing needs both the structures of the limbic system 
and the prefrontal und somatosensing Cortex.      
Therefore there exist stimuli which are „good“ or „bad“ 
because of an innate preference, and others whose 
meaning is the result of the association with those 
stimuli. The feeling leads to changes in the body, about 
which the brain is informed via neuronal and chemical 
route. To cite him:   
„That process of continuous monitoring, that that 
experience of what your body is doing while thoughts 
about contents roll by, ist he essence of what I call a 
feeling…. In other words, a feeling depends on the 
juxtaposition of an image of the body proper to an image 
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of something else, such as the visual image of a face or 
the auditory image of a melody.”(p.145)  
But Damasio (1994) doesn’t demand that the feelings are 
connected with changes in the body. In the setting of “as 
if”-feelings, in case of the association of subjects and 
situations, the changes in the body could only be shown 
through neural mechanisms. But those „playbacks“ seem 
to be far weaker than actually experienced feelings.  
The medical studies show, according to Damasio (1994), 
that sensible decisions require the working of the 
emotions, which are connected with the survival system 
of the body.  
„Nature appears to have built the apparatus of rationality 
not just on top of the apparatus of biological regulation, 
but also from it and with it. The mechanisms for behavior 
beyond drives and instincts use, I believe, both the 
upstairs and the downstairs: the neocortex becomes 
engaged along with the older brain core, and rationality 
results from their concerted activity.” (p.128) 
Fundamentally regarding our body we are in the optimal 
condition of Homeostasis, which changes when feeling an 
emotion. It changes through the following process 
(Damasio 2007; S.189): A conscious thought about a 
person or situation leads to images. The processing of 
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those images leads to signals towards the network of the 
prefrontal Cortex. Dependent on the associations between 
situations and emotions the prefrontal Cortex reacts 
automatically and subconsciously to those signals and 
activates the amygdala and the Gyrus cinguli. There we 
can observe changes of our body, and cognitive changes 
concerning the exploration and appetence behavior. 
Secondary feelings use the expression channel of the 
primary feelings, whereas the innate dispositional 
representations of primary feelings are separated from 
those of the secondary feelings.  
Simplifying the decision process in the experience-based 
learning process, emotion is associated with 
corresponding situations. The feeling while choosing an 
alternative with expected consequences, independent of 
conscious or subconscious experience, signals according 
to the somatic marker hypothesis the worth of this 
alternative. If an alternative is marked with a negative 
feeling, this alternative can be banished. The somatic 
marker, which is based on an internal preference system 
and under the influence of the environment, supports the 
logical thinking process and forms a tendency device. 
Damasio (1994) assumes the necessary basal attention 
and the basal working memory which are fundamental 
for the production of internal images is stimulated by the 
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somatic marker mechanism to order and to end the 
logical thinking process. Damages of the prefrontal 
Cortex are so central for the decision process, because it 
receives signals about environmental facts, about 
bioregulatory preferences and states of the body, and 
puts images in order and initiates the with emotions 
associated body states (Damasio 1994). 
Damasio (1994) draws our intention to the fact that the 
somatic marker can be curse or blessing. The 
simplification can lead to a disregard of objective 
probabilities, think for instance of fear of flying. 
Bechara et al. (1994) initiated, to prove the somatic 
marker hypothesis, a game of chance. There were four 
stacks, whereas two of the four generate a regular 
payment of 100 dollar, interrupted by payments of 1250 
dollar. While those stacks are risky, the other two stacks 
paid only regularly 50 dollar but those payments were 
interrupted by low punishments of 100 dollar. Bechara et 
al. (1994) showed that healthy participants preferred the 
alternative with low risk, also those who declared 
themselves as risk loving. The patients however preferred 
the first alternative and longer than patients with other 
damages. Damasio (2007, S.290f.) concludes that the 
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missing of the somatic marker, as alarming bell, is 
responsible for this observation. 
Bechara et al. (1993) proved that in case of rewards and 
punishments both the healthy participants and those 
with damage show skin conductance, but while imaging 
only the healthy do. Moreover the skin conductance of 
the healthy patients rises. Skin conductance is the result, 
initiated through the autonomous nervous system, of 
changes in the body, which activate perspiration glands 
and lead to the falling of the electric skin resistance. 
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IV. An Evolutionary Theory of Emotion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Among these, the theory of evolution is by far the most 
important, because it draws together from the most 
varied sources a mass of observations which would 
otherwise remain isolated.” 
D. Futuyma, Evolution -Das Orginal mit 
Übersetzungshilfen, Elsevier, 2007, p.14 
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According to Rolls (2014) emotions are states which are 
elicited by rewards or punishment. Motivation is a state 
in which one seeks a reward respectively a state in which 
a punishment is being avoided or escaped from. One 
works to get a reward and one works to avoid a 
punishment. To work means voluntary acts.  There are 
some stimuli which are by nature rewarding or 
punishing. Others are learned (secondary reinforcers). 
The learning mechanism is stimulus-reinforcer learning. 
Instrumental reinforcers are “stimuli that if their 
occurrence, termination, or omission is contingent upon 
making an act of action, alter the probability of the future 
emission of that action.” (Rolls 2014, p.2). “A positive 
reinforcer increases the probability of the emission of an 
act on which it is contingent.” (Rolls 2014, p.2).  “The 
negative reinforcer increases the probability of an act 
which terminates the negative reinforcer or avoids it.” 
(Rolls 2014, p.2).  The punishment means to decrease the 
probability of an action.  
Unconditioned reinforcers lead often to autonomic 
responses, which can be paired with a neutral stimulus, 
finally leading to classical conditioning, which is similar 
to stimulus-reinforcer association learning except that 
the responses are autonomic and endocrine and that the 
animal has no influence on the delivering of the 
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unconditioned stimulus. Both kinds of learning, 
stimulus-reinforcer association learning and classical 
conditioning, are important in emotions. But the 
classically conditioned responses as an association 
between stimuli and responses do not need intervening 
states like emotions to follow a goal. If we think of 
stimulus-reinforcer association learning we have to 
emphasize that this kind of learning must be capable to 
correct within shortest time if the reward or punishment 
alter, this is the task of the orbifrontal cortex.  
Stimulus-reinforcer association learning is a two-process 
learning. A previously neutral stimulus is associated with 
a primary reinforcer (stimulus-stimulus association 
learning) at the first stage. This kind of learning is very 
fast and can be reversed very rapidly. At the second stage 
there is action-outcome learning, by which an action to 
obtain the reward respectively to avoid the punishment is 
learned. It can be much slower (trial-and-error), but if 
there exist a response to a different type of reward and 
the stimulus can also be obtained using this strategy 
then it will be very fast. According to Rolls (2014) a key 
advantage of this kind of learning is that different 
rewards and punishers can be compared on a common 
scale. Having done this a cost-benefit analysis of net 
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value follows, based on simple heuristics, leading finally 
to an action. 
Comparing the brain systems of primates and non-
primates there is considerable development, thinking for 
instance of the temporal lobe.  
The two approaches of human brain imaging fMRI and 
PET are quiet coarse, so Rolls (2014) prefers to record the 
activity of single neurons or groups of single neurons. 
Sensory processing is necessary for the appraisal of 
stimuli as rewards or punishment. Those signals turn to 
the decision system, where positive and negative aspects 
are processed, and from there to the action system, 
where it is decided which action, regarding its costs, is 
carried out. 
Emotions define the goal for arbitrary acts, they are an 
intermediate state. Rolls (2014) asks if there are any 
rewards or punishment that do not lead to an emotion. 
His answer is no. Moreover the genes specify the primary 
reinforcers “in order to encourage the animal to perform 
arbitrary actions to seek particular goals, thus increasing 
the probability of their own (the genes) survival into the 
next generation.” (Rolls 2014; p.16)  
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We can distinguish emotions by being positive or negative 
and their reinforcement contingency. There is an 
increasing intensity on a continuous scale. Emotions 
associated with the delivery of a reward include pleasure, 
elation and ecstasy. Emotions associated with the 
delivery of a punisher include apprehension, fear and 
terror. The omission of a reward or its termination leads 
to frustration, anger and rage. The omission of a 
punisher leads to relief. Beside the reinforcement 
contingency and the intensity there is room for multiple 
reinforcement associations, and that stimuli associated 
with different primary reinforcers will be different, and 
emotions will be different if the conditioned stimuli are 
different and finally emotions will differ if there is 
variation in the behavioral responses. Moreover the 
extent to which a stimulus is reinforcing depends on the 
history of reinforcement, think of sensory-specific satiety. 
According to Rolls (2014) most reinforcing stimuli have 
their origin in the external environment, so one can 
debate if one excludes drive states that are produced by a 
change of the interial milieu. Furthermore emotional 
states can be produced by remembered reinforcing 
stimuli. In Rolls (2014) theory there is also room for 
cognitive processing, so that the stimulus from the 
environment is appraised as reward or punishment. 
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Cognition can also influence emotional responses, so that 
the word (“cheese”, “body odour”) influences the 
subjective pleasantness ratings. Moreover there exists the 
phenomenon of positive and negative contrast. If an 
animal is working moderately for a reward she will work 
very much harder for some time if there is a sudden 
increase of reward, but will then gradually come back to 
work at the old rate.  
According to Rolls (2014) a  motivational state is one in 
which a goal is desired. An emotion is a state elicited 
when a goal is obtained. A mood is a continuing state 
normally elicited by a reinforcer, and is thus part of what 
is an emotion. Mood states are not necessarily about an 
object.   
A function of emotion is to elicit autonomic and 
endocrine responses to prepare the body for action. 
Another is the flexibility of behavioral responses. 
Moreover emotional states are motivating. Another 
function lies in the communication, in that one decodes 
the signal of another animal as reward or punisher. The 
social attachment is another function, the emotions 
associated with the attachment of the children to their 
parents or the attachment of the parents to each other. 
The mood can influence the cognitive evaluation of 
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memories. Emotions can facilitate the memory storage. 
Emotional and mood states are persistent and help to 
produce persistent motivation. Finally emotions may 
trigger memory recall and influence cognitive processing.  
On a higher complexity level one can find processing that 
includes syntactic operations on semantically grounded 
symbols, which leads to multistep one-off plans. 
According to Rolls (2014) there are several layers 
regarding the processing of stimuli. The first layer gives 
answers to the question “what”. What is the taste, what is 
its intensity? The inferior temporal visual cortex includes 
the representations of objects and is invariant referring to 
the exact position on the retina, the size and the view 
angle. The second layer leads to the calculation of reward 
values of primary reinforcers in the orbifrontal cortex. 
Primary reinforcers are touch, taste, odour and possibly 
face expressions and novelty. The second layer includes 
also the association between neutral stimuli and primary 
reinforcers in the amygdala and the orbifrontal cortex. 
The third layer is the medial prefrontal cortex and is 
connected to the decision making. Finally we have the 
output systems. The autonomic and endocrine systems 
prepare actions. The unconscious or implicit actions are 
made in the basal ganglia for habit learning and the 
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cingulated cortex for action-outcome learning. The last 
output system is the system which is capable of planning 
many steps ahead and is part of the linguistic system 
using syntactic processing to plan.  
Regarding the secondary reinforcers the representation 
has the following requirements: Firstly invariance, there 
is no certain view angle necessary when learning. 
Secondly generalization of similar objects leading to a 
Hebb learning rule. Thirdly the graceful degradation, if a 
few of the input axons or synapses are damaged then the 
remainder can still produce the correct answer. Fourthly 
the high capacity meaning that it is capable of 
representing separately many different objects. Finally 
the independence from reward value, so that we don’t go 
blind when they changed from rewarding to neutral. 
Now let us turn to the orbifrontal cortex. The 
magnocellular, medial part of the mediodorsal nucleus to 
the orbifrontal surface of the prefrontal cortex is called 
orbifrontal cortex. It gets information from the inferior 
temporal visual cortex regarding the taste, odour and 
touch. Damage to the orbifrontal cortex leads in apes to 
less aggression towards humans and snakes, in humans 
to euphoria, irresponsibility, lack of affect and 
impulsiveness. They lack the ability to learn from non-
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reward, for instance if a reinforcement is reversed or if in 
extinction they respond to an object that is no more 
rewarded (Meunier, Bachevalier and Mishkin 1997). Rolls 
(2014) hypothesis is that the orbifrontal cortex is involved 
in representing reward value and its rapid updating. 
Some neurons are activated when there are primary 
reinforcers and represent outcome value. Hunger 
modulates this value in the orbifrontal cortex, contrary to 
the primary taste cortex (sensory-specific satiety, 
Critchley and Rolls 1996c). Other neurons are activated if 
there are learned secondary reinforcers and thus 
represent expected value. There exist negative reward 
prediction error neurons (Thorpe, Rolls and Maddison 
1983).  
Now let us turn to the amygdala. It receives inputs from 
higher stages of sensory processing, it receives inputs 
about objects that could become secondary reinforcers, 
because of pattern association with primary reinforcers. 
The amygdala influences the motor systems, autonomic 
systems, some cortical and limbic area.  
Damage of the amygdala leads to tameness, lack of 
emotional answers, excessive examination of objects and 
eating previously rejected objects (Weiskrantz 1956). 
Murray and Izquierdo (2007) showed that selective 
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amygdala lesions do not affect object reversal learning 
but lesions of the orbifrontal cortex do. So the orbifrontal 
cortex seems to be quiet important for one-trial learning 
and reversal (associative and ruled-based). –Besides there 
is the phenomenon of reconsolidation, that after a 
memory has been stored, it may be weakened or lost if 
recall is performed during the presence of a protein 
synthesis inhibitor. Sanghera, Rolls and Roper-Hall 
(1979) show that after reversal 10 out of 11 neurons did 
not reverse their responses. So Rolls (2014) comes on 
page 178 to the result that “the evidence now available 
indicates that primate amygdala neurons do not alter 
their activity flexibly and rapidly in relearning visual 
discrimination reversal learning.”  
Now let us turn to the cingulated cortex, which gets 
inputs from the orbifrontal cortex about the outcome 
value respectively the expected value of stimuli. The 
anterior cingulated cortex in combination with the 
midcingulate motor area interfaces action to outcome 
(action-outcome-learning) and include the cost of the 
particular action (Walton, Bannerman, Alterescu and 
Rushworth 2003). The anterior cingulated cortex is 
sensitive to the devaluation of a value.  
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In the medial prefrontal cortex area 10 there are 
decisions between different stimuli (Rolls et al. 2010). 
Finally we come to the output pathways for emotional 
responses. The first output system is the autonomic and 
endocrine system, which prepares the body for action. 
The second, thinking of implicit responses, is the motor 
system. The third is a system for explicit responses to 
emotional stimuli.  
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V. Heuristics and Rationality 
 
 
 
 
 
„Hier kommt es auf den „Blick“ an, auf die Fähigkeit, die 
Dinge in einer Weise zu sehen, die sich dann hinterher 
bewährt, auch wenn sie im Moment nicht zu begründen 
ist, und das Wesentliche fest und das Unwesentliche gar 
nicht auffasst, auch wenn und gerade dann, wenn man 
sich über Grundsätze, nach denen man dabei verfährt, 
keine Rechenschaft geben kann. Gründliche Vorarbeit 
und Sachkenntnis, Weite des intellektuellen Verstehens, 
Talent zu logischer Zergliederung können unter 
Umständen zu Quellen von Misserfolgen werden.“  
Joseph Schumpeter, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung (1997), S.125  
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Looking at decisions in modern economic theory all 
alternatives are weighted by incorporating all information 
and all the probabilities. This procedure, called rational, 
bases on the expected utility maximization by Daniel 
Bernouilli, it is connected with the view of omniscience 
(perfect knowledge) and omnipotence (unlimited 
computational power) and determinism. Therefore the 
optimizing individual can be described as Laplace’s 
demon (Gigerenzer, 2008a). Such an optimization doesn’t 
seem feasible for many economic problems, because one 
can’t calculate the optimum in polynomial time (called 
NP-complete). So a game of chess is turned into Tic-Tac-
Toe according to Gigerenzer (2008b). The problems are so 
much simplified that they don’t deliver solutions to the 
real world any more. There is a trade-off between ruling 
the problems and the significance of the results. The 
followers of the rational view argue that it’s only 
important that the prediction is correct but not the way 
towards it (Friedman 1953). But in reality we can 
frequently observe the problem of robustness resp. 
overfitting. The high number of parameters in utility 
maximization models enables intelligent designers to fit 
their model perfectly to the past, but many of those 
models deliver only bad predictions of the future. 
Moreover there are problems of subjective targets, for 
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instance what is the optimal sound, infinite regress when 
problems are unfamiliar and time is scarce and the 
sensible weighting of multiple goals. From a neurological 
view a logical solution can take way too much time. So 
patients who suffer from a prefrontal damage show the 
tendency to lose themselves in the decision process 
(Damasio 2007, S.263f.).  
Now let us turn to heuristics. Heuristics are the basis for 
gut feelings (Gigerenzer, 2008d, on page 57). Complete 
rationality will, according to Gigerenzer and Todd (1999), 
be replaced by ecological rationality. We turn from logic 
to the environment. From this point of view heuristics 
aren’t inferior. Dependent on the environment heuristics 
can be the only rational answer. Gigerenzer und Todd 
(1999) speak of fast and frugal heuristics, fast because 
they needs little time, frugal because they needs little 
information. So they examine when those are ecological 
rational. The idea of a heuristic can be demonstrated by 
looking at the following example. The physical 
calculations to compute the place where a thrown ball 
hits the ground need in the simplest case the distance 
and the angle of the trajectory. After doing the maths 
using the first chapters of the Halliday et. al (2007) we 
can get the solution but in reality the problem is way 
harder. In reality we have to include the air resistance, 
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the wind and the spin of the ball. It isn’t realistic to 
believe that a human is able to find a solution to this very 
complex problem. Instead a person will use the following 
simple look heuristic:”Fix the ball, begin to run and adapt 
your speed so that the angle of view stays constant  
(Gigerenzer, 2008c, S.19). Or think of the decision to 
marry. Gigerenzer und Goldstein (1999) explain it in the 
following way (best-first heuristic). One after another we 
examine the following alternatives, in this case marry yes 
or marry no, concerning some decision keys. The 
procedure ends when one of the both alternatives is 
clearly better. It’s obvious that the order of the keys is of 
high importance when using this heuristic. So the order 
depends on the past validity. According to Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein (1999) the inferences by the best-first heuristic 
are at least so exact as standard statistical procedures 
(for instance the multiple regression), but with far less 
work. Moreover the heuristic was very robust. (Czerlinski 
et al. 1999) show that the predictions of the best-first 
heuristic were the best ones.  
Pingle und Day (1996) present in their work some past 
experiments. The question they asked to what extent 
actions, which are not procedural rational, are important 
in economic situations. Because of the high costs of 
rational procedures the result must not be optimal. 
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Decision cost and misuse cost have to be included. Not 
procedural rational actions are try and error, imitation 
(Pingle 1995), following an authority, habit, unmotivated 
search and intuition. Pingle und Day (1996) show that 
the existence of decision costs leads to actions which are 
not procedural rational. Moreover the use of not 
procedural rational decisions increases the efficiency of 
decisions. The authors believe that several methods are 
necessary to decide in a favorable way. Economic 
principles which are followed are diminishing returns, 
specialization and exchange. Furthermore Pingle und Day 
(1996) conclude that an optimal result is based on the 
use of evolutionary procedures, which unify the different 
actions. They believe also that the “as-if” hypothesis by 
Friedman (1953) isn’t correct without doubt, there could 
be distortions on markets, so that a competitive 
equilibrium is prevented.        
But also the emotion can be a heuristic. According to 
Slovic et al. (2003) the affect is a conscious or 
unconscious emotional state, which marks the positive or 
negative quality of a stimulus. They call decisions based 
on these emotional states the affect heuristic. They 
conclude in the following manner: 
45 
 
„This heuristic appears at once both wondrous and 
frightening: wondrous in its speed, and subtlety, and 
sophistication, and its ability to “lubricate reason”; 
frightening in its dependency upon context and 
experience, allowing us to be led astray or manipulated – 
inadvertently or intentionally – silently and invisibly.” 
The protruding emotions in the decision process depend 
on the task, the individual and their interaction. 
According to Slovic et al. (2004) humans use an affect-
pool, where one can find all the positively and negatively 
marked images which differ in their intensity. Using the 
affect heuristic humans rely on their emotion regarding 
an object. Alkahami and Slovic (1994) show that in reality 
there is not a positive correlation between the felt risk 
and the felt benefit but an inverse relationship.    
Also Clore and Schnall (2005), Forgas (1995) or Schwarz 
and Clore (1988) emphasize that individuals conclude 
from the emotion to the attitude regarding a product. 
Wright (1975) and Pham (1998) talk also about a 
connection of affect and product choice. Hsee and 
Kunreuther (2000) show that the purchase of an 
insurance depends of the emotional connotation of the 
product. Yamagishi (1997) proved that people who follow 
the presentation of relative frequencies regarding the 
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mortality of a disease took the disease not as seriously as 
the presentation of pictures and the absolute frequencies. 
Muramatsu and Hanoch (2005) refer in their work to 
emotions as activators of fast and frugal heuristics 
(Gigerenzer et al. 1999). The heuristic are activated after 
an assessment mechanism which judges if an object is 
friend or foe. If actually there is a danger or a chance, 
fast and frugal heuristics are nudged, for example 
stressing certain keys (Faucher und Tappolet 2002), 
reducing options (Earl 1986) and finally setting the clues 
for the end of information processing (Ketelaar und Todd 
2000). 
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VI. Risk-as-Feelings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„It’s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your door.” 
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1955) 
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Our emotional system discovers urgent risks and reacts 
accordingly (Armony et al. 1997). In this case there could 
be differences between cognitively judged and emotionally 
judged risks (Ness und Klaas 1994). According to Isaac 
and James (2000) and Barsky et al. (1997) the observable 
risk behavior is very variable and inconsistent. Slovic et 
al. (2004) distinguishes risk-as-feelings as fast 
instinctively and intuitive reaction in the case of danger 
and risk-as-analysis, based on logic, reason and scientific 
thinking. Hsee and Weber (1987) have shown the effect of 
emotions on the risk behavior. It was observed that the 
participants, based on their own emotions, were 
riskaverse, but they judge the average student as, not 
based on their emotions, as riskneutral. 
The risk-as-feelings thesis of Loewenstein et al. (2001) 
tells us that answer in the case of uncertain decisions are 
based on angst, concern and fear. Cognitive evaluations 
lead to emotions which influence cognitive evaluations. 
Immediate risks are processed in a different way on the 
emotional level, not by multiplying the probabilities with 
the consequences. Contrary to the cognitive system, 
which is based on objective assessments, emotional 
assessments do include the vividness of images, the own 
experience and past conditionings. Other determinants 
are the time between announcement and realization of 
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the decision or the evolutionary preparation (Loewenstein 
et al. 2001). 
Regarding the vividness of the consequences Brown and 
Hoyt (2000) for example show that the acquaintance of a 
person, who survived a flood or an earthquake, rises the 
insurance probability. Emotionally stimulating anecdotes 
are more effective than bare statistics (Hendickxs et al. 
1989). Johnson et al. (1993) discovered that an insurance 
that covers only terrorist attacks was more worth than an 
insurance which covers every kind of death. Slovic et al. 
(2000) ask doctors how risky they estimate the release of 
psychic ill patient. The likelihood of an aggression was 
expressed in frequencies and in probabilities. Because 
the description by frequencies leads to images of an 
aggressive patient, so that the judgment was more 
negative.             
Now let us turn to Rottenstreich und Hsee (1999). They 
plead for strengthening the S-form of the weighting 
function, known from prospect theory, in the case of 
affective consequences. Hopes and fears lead to jumps at 
the edges of the weighting function, while one can 
observe a low marginal sensitivity in the middle. With an 
experiment they proved the low sensitivity regarding the 
probability. They asked the participants of the 
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experiment how much they pay for avoiding an electric 
shock or the payment of 20 dollar. A probability of one 
percent led to median of seven dollar in the case of a 
threatening electrical shock and a median of one dollar in 
the second case. A probability of 99 percent led to a 
median of 10 dollar in the first case and to a median of 
18 dollar in the second case. Sunstein und Zeckhauser 
(2011) confirmed this phenomenon. They refer to the 
availability heuristic of Tversky und Kahneman (1973), 
where available instances with risk lead to overreactions 
and not available instances lead to doing nothing. The 
probability is unimportant for the amount of excitement 
before a threatening electrical shock (Bankhart und 
Elliott 1974, Elliott 1975 und Monat et al. 1972), but the 
amount is important (Deane 1969). Loewenstein et al. 
(2001) speculate that fear has an all-or-nothing character 
and the bare possibility dominating the probability. 
Extreme behavior was observed by Ratner und Herbst 
(2005) after a successful broker showed a negative result. 
One could observe an overreaction of his customers who 
turn to a not that successful broker. The reason for this 
polarization is according to Pham et al. (2001) that 
affective decisions are by far more extreme than decisions 
based on reason and furthermore that humans search for 
confirmation of their initial emotion. 
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Baumeister et al. (2007) don’t believe that emotion has a 
direct influence on the behavior. Rather the emotion acts 
as feedback (in this case the risk), so that we are able to 
learn from our behavior and the consequences. 
Baumeister et al. (2007) distinguish a direct automatic 
affect and a later entering conscious emotion.  
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VII. The Two Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Humans, more than Econs, also need protection from 
others who deliberately exploit their weaknesses- and 
especially the quirks of System 1 and the laziness of 
System 2.“ 
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Penguin 
Books, 2011 
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Massey (2002) distinguishes based on the neuro anatomy 
two systems, an emotional and a rational, which 
although connected, act parallel and deliver different 
results. As we have seen, the work of LeDoux (1998) 
supports this idea. The information about a dangerous 
situation arrives in rats from the Thalamus above two 
ways towards the amygdala, a direct way through the 
limbic system and a way above the neocortex. Through 
simple conditioning which was canceled and a surgical 
operation which disconnects the nerve tract between the 
prefrontal cortex and the amygdala it was shown that the 
answer of both systems differs. Moreover the removal of 
huge parts of the cortex doesn’t affect the emotional 
reaction, whereas the threshold sinks, so that the cortex 
seems to regulate the reaction (LeDoux 1987). Metcalfe 
and Mischel (1999) distinguish a hot emotional system 
(simple, reactive and fast) and a cold cognitive system 
(complex, reflexive and slow), whereas the actual behavior 
depends on the successful system.  
Chaiken and Trope (1999) present an overall view of 
psychological two-processes-models.            
Finally because of the faster „data line“ the emotional 
system should influence the rational system way more 
than vice versa (Carter, 1998; LeDoux, 1998). An 
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information reaches the amygdale a fourth second earlier 
than the prefrontal Cortex. The output of the affective 
systems seems to be a prerequisite for decisions (Wilson 
and Schooler, 1991). If the ventromedial cortex, the 
connection between the affective and the cognitive 
system, is damaged this prevents the simplest decisions. 
Vice versa the influence on the affective system of the 
cognitive system seems difficult and has high emotional 
and physical costs and could end with the strengthening 
of the emotion (Ochsner and Gross, 2004). Loewenstein 
and O’Donoghue (2004) conclude: 
„Affect not only holds greater sway over deliberation than 
vice-versa, but affective reactions tend to occur first, 
temporally, with deliberations typically playing a 
secondary, corrective, role.” 
Gilbert und Gill (2000) believe that humans are 
momentary realists, who trust primary their emotions 
and correct this view only slowly through a expensive 
cognitive process. Here fits an anecdote by Charles 
Darwin: 
„I put my face close tot he thick glass-plate in front of a 
puff-ader in the Zoological Gardens, with the firm 
determination of not starting back if the snake struck at 
me; but, as soon as the blow was struck, my resolution 
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went for nothing, and I jumped a yard or two backwards 
with astonishing rapidity. My will and reason were 
powerless against the imagination of a danger which had 
never been experienced.” 
 (Charles Darwin, in LeDoux (1998), p.112) 
Loewenstein und O’Donoghue (2004) also distinguish a 
cognitive and an affective system. They assume that both 
systems interact to finally fix a behavior. The cognitive 
system, which makes it possible to act goal-oriented, 
correspondents to the standard model of economics. But 
to explain certain phenomena one has to include 
emotions. Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) tell us 
that already Plato distinguished both systems (Plato, 
Republic 441). Also Adam Smith stresses the fight 
between passion and the impartial spectator. Contrary to 
the neuroscience (for instance Carter, 1998) he sees the 
advantage on the side of the impartial spectator. But he 
makes the following statement: 
„There are some situations which bear so hard upon 
human nature that the greatest degree of self-
government, which can belong to so imperfect a creature 
as man, is not able to stifle, altogether, the voice of 
human weakness, or reduce the violence of the passions 
to that pitch of moderation, in which the impartial 
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spectator can entirely enter into them.” (Smith (2002); 
1759:29) 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) integrate the 
concept of willpower. Baumeister und Vohs (2003) prove 
that the willpower made it possible for the cognitive 
system to succeed. The willpower acts like a muscle, 
needing energy which is limited. Constantly deciding can 
weaken the willpower (Baumeister und Vohs, 2003). Shiv 
und Fedorikhin (1999) argue that load of the shortterm 
working memory in the prefrontal Cortex can lead to 
affectively dominated decisions. Shiffman and Waters 
(2004) show that this is also so in the case of stress.     
Finally Massey (2002) argues in the following manner 
why the rationality should not be overemphasized: (1) The 
actions of our ancestors based on emotions. (2) The 
necessary tool for rationality, the prefrontal Cortex, 
developed very late regarding the human existence. (3) 
While we have the physiological foundations since 
150000 years, it took more than 100000 years until the 
mental skills developed to use them in symbolic thinking. 
(4) It takes 45.000 years until words were packed in 
writing. (5) 5.000 years later education arises and so 
rationality became available for the mass. (6) Human 
behavior is based on the emotional and rational 
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mentalities, whereas the emotional is way older and 
influences the rational one more strongly than vice versa. 
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VIII. Moods, Social Learning and Mirror 
Neurons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Unsere gewöhnliche Stimmung hängt von der Stimmung 
ab, in der wir unsere Umgebung zu erhalten wissen.“ 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenröte (Aph.283) 
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As Akerlof and Shiller (2009) tell us that the core of trust 
doesn’t lie in rationality. Believe replaces reason. Often 
information which is required to act rationally is 
completely ignored respectively so manipulated that the 
decision seems rational. The gut feelings succeed. Akerlof 
and Shiller (2009) explain on page 90: 
„Trust is more as an individual state of mind. Trust of the 
individual is based on how confidently other people judge 
the mood of the others. It’s a way to see the world, a 
popular image of the world, a common understanding of 
the mechanisms of economic change, accompanied by 
the media and ordinary conversations. A climate of 
confidence is accompanied by inspiring stories, by stories 
about business activities and the way how others became 
rich.”  
According to Schwarz und Bohner (1990) mood means a 
momentary, subjective state of a person which can be 
described by the dimension „good disposition-
indisposition“. Moods are atmospheric diffuse, subdivided 
state experiences (Ewert, 1983) of low intensity. Moreover 
moods are contrary to emotions not directed towards a 
certain object. The cause of a certain mood, let it be a 
person or a situation, isn’t detected by the individual. The 
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notion affect includes both the emotion and the moods. 
According to Bollnow (1956) moods arise after emotions.  
In the influential work of Bower (1981) he compares 
humans with magnets that attract mood congruent 
material. His studies show that participants in good 
mood identify themselves with a happy character and 
remember facts about the happy character in a story with 
a happy and a sad person and vice versa for sad 
individuals. Bower (1981) argues that a sad mood leads 
to sad memories, which lead to an improved memory of 
the sad input. Alternatively congruent material 
strengthens the emotional intensity and this leading to 
better memorizing. Besides Bower (1981) presents the 
phenomenon of state dependent memory, with better 
memorizing if the participant is in the same mood like 
that when she learned the facts. Both phenomenon are 
explained in Bower‘s network theory (Bower 1981). 
Regarding the memory one can observe that dependent 
on the mood better respectively worse memories are 
easier available (Bower 1981; Blaney 1986, Isen 1984). 
Because participants in bad mood search for positive 
memories (see Clark and Isen 1982), the influence of 
negative moods isn’t as obvious. Schwarz und Bohner 
(1990) argue that this is the result of the isolated 
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situation the participants are in, so that in groups bad 
mood has more influence.  
Besides the memories also assessments are influenced by 
moods (Isen et al. 1978; Clore et al. 1983). Schwarz 
(1988) argues that the mood is information which 
becomes part of the judgment. Hints that the mood 
distorts the judgment would neutralize its effect which 
actually can be observed (see Schwarz and Clore 1983). 
Humans rely on their emotions when an assessment is of 
affective nature, when there is little information, when 
the task is complex or when little time is available 
(Schwarz and Clore 2007). Greifeneder et al. (2011) ask 
also when humans rely on their emotion. The following 
moderators seem to be important: salience of the emotion 
(compared to other information); the representativeness 
of the emotions regarding the target (degree in which 
emotions arise from the target and reflect important 
characteristics); relevance (regarding an assessment); 
evaluative malleability (assessment is open to external 
influences); process intensity.  
So there exist two opposing theories, the affect-as-
information and the model of mood congruent memory, 
which attributes the distortion of an assessment to 
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incomplete recall of information, so that the mood 
congruent information is in advantage.   
Moreover a good mood leads to positive judgments of life 
contentment, products and past events (Wright und 
Bower 1992, Bagozzi et al. 1999). Mood is especially 
decisive when abstract assessments are demanded 
(Forgas 1995). In good mood simple heuristics were used 
(Bless et al. 1996), in bad mood we see detailed analytical 
activities (Sinclair und Mark 1995). Furthermore 
Johnson und Tversky (1983) show that negative mood 
increases the assumed frequencies of risks globally.  
Studies prove that the risk attitude does not depend only 
on the amount of excitement, but also on the appraisal 
content (Lerner und Keltner 2001, Raghunathan und 
Pham 1999). If there is fear, so little control and high 
uncertainty, then the target of risk minimization was 
followed and the risk averse variant chosen. If sorrow 
dominates then the target of return maximization is 
followed and the risky variant chosen. Moreover Lerner 
and Keltner (2001) present that fear leads to risk averse 
choices and joy to optimistic choices.  
For an overall view about the results of positive 
respectively negative affects read Schwarz and Clore 
(2007) or Pham (2007). 
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The realized mood is connected to the social environment 
of the individual. So Neumann and Strack (2000) prove 
the transfer of moods. The lecture with a sad respectively 
with a happy voice leads to corresponding moods in the 
listeners. This happened without asking the listeners to 
adopt the mood. The listeners aren’t aware of the 
influence of the speaker. Neumann and Strack (2000) 
believe that there is a two-stage process of mood 
contagion. Firstly there is an imitation of the visible key 
signs of a mood, leading to a change in the mood.  
There is evidence of the deterioration of moods in healthy 
individuals because of a contact with depressed persons 
(Coyne et al. 1987 or Joiner 1994). According to 
Mansfield et al. (1989) there were connected moods in 
pairs, who reported their mood every day. Also Hatfield et 
al. (1994) showed that there was a mood transfer in 
individuals. Anderson et al. (2003) examined during a 
year the relationship between date-partners and college-
roommates and find an increasing similarity of the 
emotional answers. Moreover they find out that 
emotionally similar relationships were more stable and 
were destroyed with a smaller probability. The authors 
think that this can be as a sign that emotional adaption 
coordinates the thoughts and actions supporting the 
social cohesiveness. Conscious of their own mood, put in 
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a good or bad mood, individuals decide to consume mood 
incongruent material when there will be an social 
interaction, maybe to neutralize its effect (Erber et al. 
1996). This is not so, if they get the information that the 
partner in the interaction shows the identical mood.     
The study of Bartel und Saavedra (2000) by observing 70 
work groups shows tendencies to convergence. The 
convergence depended on the task, the social 
interdependency and the stability of the groups. The 
faces, voices and gestures were obvious hints for the 
mood and so communicate a certain mood. One can 
particularly recognize moods with a high degree of 
activation showing higher convergence and the existence 
of mood regulating norms. Bartel and Saavedra (2000) 
conclude from the convergence in eight mood categories 
that emotional comparisons and emotional contagion are 
responsible for it and not situational factors. In the case 
of an emotional comparison the individual assesses by 
comparison with other individuals the “correct” emotional 
answer (Schachter und Singer 1962). In the case of an 
emotional contagion there is a tendency to imitate 
automatically faces, movements and sounds (Hatfield et 
al. 1994). 
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Totterdell (2000) discovers that the average positive mood 
of a cricket-team is connected with the mood of the team 
members, independent of personal problems and the 
score. The more, the older the team members were and 
the more they felt connected to the team and the more 
they were susceptible to emotional contagion (Totterdell 
et al. 1998 show the same for nurses whose contact time 
with the other nurses amounts to only to 
1
5
 of the working 
time). Common activities and a happy mood strengthen 
the mood connection. Moreover the assessment of the 
mood of the group was based on their own mood, so that 
it acts as an indicator. The assessment of the own 
performance depended on the mood.  
According to Goleman et al. (2001) the mood of the leader 
of a firm causes chain reactions which influence all 
employees:      
„Moods that start at the top tend to move fastest because 
everyone watches the boss. They take their emotional 
cues from him. Even when the boss isn’t highly visible – 
for example, the CEO who works behind closed doors on 
an upper floor – his attitude affects the moods of his 
direct reports, and a domino effect ripples throughout the 
company.” (S. 47) 
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Already Redl (1942) refers to the influence of group 
leaders on the emotion of the group. Sy et al. (2005) 
believe the mood signals if the progress is satisfying 
resulting in more or less coordination, more or less effort 
or using a more or less suitable strategy. Furthermore 
they show that in case of a positive mood of the leader 
the mood of the other group members was also more 
positive, the group specific affective tone (see George 
1990) was also more positive, the result more coordinated 
and leading to less effort. Bono and Ilies (2006) find also 
mood contagion from the leader towards the employees, 
especially if the leader is charismatic (Cherulnik et al. 
2001).    
Finally we point at the fact that mood contagion depends 
on the group membership. Leach et al. (2003) tell us that 
football fans become happy when the other team has bad 
luck. Gordijn et al. (2001) present the following result, 
students show more positive affect and less negative 
affect when an individual outside their group experienced 
negative consequences. Similarly Weisbuch und Ambady 
(2008) argue that the membership is of highest 
importance for the affective answer towards an emotion 
expressing individual. If the member of the other group 
shows fears the opposite group members show 
spontaneous positive affective answers and vice versa. A 
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nervous address of the other group signals dominance 
and lessens fears, while a nervous address of a member 
of the own group signals servility and leads to fear.     
Now let us turn to the phenomenon of social learning of 
fear. An animal can by observation of an individual of the 
same species learn to fear dangerous stimuli. Because 
one can observe such a behavior in many species, for 
instance in the case of cats (John et al., 1968), one can 
assume that it leads to advantage in the survival of the 
fittest. The strength of the fear reaction of the observed 
victim is connected with the resulting fear reaction of the 
observer in primates (Mineka und Cook, 1993). The 
reason for this seems to be the highly developed ability to 
generate and to process facial expressions (Ekman, 
1982). Studies with apes show that the face full of fear of 
the same species can be regarded as unconditioned 
stimulus, because there are huge parallels between social 
fear learning and classic conditioning (Mineka und Cook 
1993). The same can be observed in humans (Vaughan 
und Lanzetta 1980; Olsson et al. 2004). In the case of 
children with phobias regarding certain objects or 
situations the reaction of their parents regarding those 
seems to be the reason (Mineka et al. 2006).  
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Because the social learning of fear seems to be related to 
the classic conditioning Olsson et al. (2007) conclude 
that the neuronal processes are the same. Actually they 
show the amygdala was activated in the case of social 
fear learning and classic conditioning.  
Humans contrary to other species can learn to fear not 
only by observing the fear of others but also by hearing a 
fearful story or reading it (Olsson und Phelps 2007). 
Olsson und Phelps (2007) show that the reactions of 
classic conditioning, social fear learning and the 
association between stimulus and instructions are the 
same. But the subconscious presentation of the 
conditioned stimulus leads only to reactions in the case 
of classic conditioning and social fear learning. Olsson 
and Phelps (2007) think that learning by instruction has 
a different learning mechanism and needs conscious 
perception.  
Now let us turn to the mirror neuron theory. For the life 
of a primate it is highly important to understand the 
actions of other individuals. Moreover humans possess 
the fascinating ability to imitate. For both the mirror 
neuron system seems to be of highest importance. As 
mirror neurons one describes a class of visuomotoric 
neurones, which unload if the ape exercises a certain 
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motoric action and if the ape observes another ape doing 
that action. Firstly they were perceived in the premotoric 
cortex (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992, Gallese et al. 1996, 
Rizzolatti et al. 1996). The mirror neurons react only if an 
action is connected with an object. If the action is done 
by humans or apes doesn’t make a difference. One can 
distinguish strictly congruent and broadly congruent 
mirror neurons dependent on the congruence between 
observed and own action (Gallese et al. 1996). Using the 
mirror neurons the individual gets the information what 
the result of an observed action is (Rizzolatti et al. 2001). 
Umilta et al. (2001) observe that the mirror neurons 
unload when seeing the last part of the reaching out for 
an object although the ape doesn’t see this last part. 
More than the half of the mirror neurons unload.  
The understanding of a motoric action is surely 
important but so is to understand the thoughts, emotions 
and intentions (for an overall view Oberman und 
Ramachandran 2007). Two theories compete in the 
theory of mind. The theory-theory is based on a cognitive 
theory to understand the thoughts, emotions and 
intentions, while the simulation theory is based on the 
internal simulation (Carruthers und Smith 1996). 
Obviously the simulation theory is connected to the 
mirror neuron theory. 
70 
 
The study by Dimberg und Lundqvist (1988) showed that 
the facial expressions of other individuals were imitated, 
also if the facial expressions were presented 
subconsciously (Dimberg et al. 2000). If one lowers the 
ability to imitate, Niedenthal et al. (2001) present the 
result that the transition from a happy to a sad face was 
perceived tardy in comparison to a control group.   
By fMRI one can show that the regions between the own 
experience of emotions and the observed emotion overlap 
(Singer et al. 2004; Wicker et al. 2003). In the case of 
disgust certain stimuli lead to certain reactions (Rozin et 
al. 2000), connected to the insula. One can prove that the 
insula reacts in the case of disgust in others and that it 
depends on the strength of the disgust (Phillips et al. 
1997, Wicker et al. (2003)). A damage of the insula does 
not only lead to less experience of disgust but also to the 
inability to perceive disgust in others (Calder et al. 2000). 
Adolphs et al. (2002) and Sprengelmeyer et al. (1999) 
show that a damaged amygdala impaired the ability to 
experience fear and to perceive fear in others.   
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IX. Worst Case and Best Case 
 
 
 
 
 
“If someone is predisposed to be worried, degrees of 
unlikeliness seem to provide no comfort, unless one can 
prove that harm is absolute impossible, which itself is not 
possible.” Weingart (2001), p.362  
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According to Sunstein (2001): ”Many experiments suggest 
that when it comes to risk, a key question is whether 
people can imagine or visualize the “worst case” outcome. 
When worst case produces intense fear, little role is 
played by the stated probability that that outcome will 
occur. An important function of strong emotions is then 
to drive out quantitative judgments, including judgments 
about probability, by making the best case or worst case 
seem highly salient.”(p.6) Looking at casinos and 
insurance companies: “With respect to hope, those who 
operate gambling casinos and state lotteries are well-
aware of the underlying mechanisms. They play on 
people’s emotions in the particular sense that they 
conjure up palpable pictures of victory and easy living. 
With respect to risks, insurance companies and 
environmental groups do exactly the same.” (p.14) 
Sunstein (2001) presents the “alarmist bias”, which 
means that “When presented with competing accounts of 
danger, people tend to move toward the more alarming 
account.” (p.14) Including the media: “If newspapers, 
magazines, and news programs are streaming certain 
harms from remote risks, people’s concern is likely to be 
out of proportion to reality.” (p.15) 
Understanding the probability neglect, one can use this 
knowledge to do good things like decreasing the number 
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of smokers: “And if government is attempting to increase 
public concern with a genuine danger, it should not 
emphasize statistics and probabilities, but should instead 
draw attention to the worst case scenario”. (p.5) But there 
is an asymmetry between increasing fear and decreasing 
it. If one wants to decrease the fear the best approach 
seems to be change the subject but if this is not possible: 
“Government should attempt to educate and inform 
people, rather than capitulating to unwarranted fear. On 
the other hand, public fear, however unwarranted, may 
be intractable, in the sense that it is imperious to efforts 
at reassurance. And if fear is intractable, it will cause 
serious problems, because fear is itself extremely 
unpleasant, and because fear is likely to influence 
conduct, producing (for example) wasteful and excessive 
private precaution. If so, a governmental response, via 
regulatory safeguards, would appear to be justified if the 
benefits, in terms of fear reduction, justify the costs.”(p.5-
6) Moreover: “Because people suffer from probability 
neglect, and because neglecting probability is not fully 
rational, the phenomenon I identify casts additional 
doubt on the widespread idea that ordinary people have a 
kind of “richer rationality” superior to that of experts.” 
(p.5) Looking at markets Sunstein (2001) speculates: “But 
we might expect that risk markets will reduce the 
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problem of neglect, if only because number of people will 
appreciate the relevant differences, and drive wage and 
prices in the appropriate direction.” (p.8) Moreover 
looking at the heterogeneity of people: “Those who are 
peculiarly insensitive to probability information are likely 
to do poorly in many domains, including economic 
markets.” (p.15)  
There was an intense debate about whether the National 
Environmental Policy Act requires agencies to discuss the 
worst-case scenario in environmental impact statements.  
Lopes (1986) presents a two-factor Theory for Risky 
Choice with a dispositional and a situational factor. “The 
dispositional factor describes the underlying motives that 
dispose people to be oriented at achieving security (risk 
averse) or to exploiting potential (risk seeking).” (p.18) 
“The situational factor describes people’s responses to 
immediate needs and opportunities.” (p.18) Moreover 
“risk averse and risk seeking individuals differ in whether 
they pay most attention to the worst outcomes in a 
distribution or the best outcome. Risk averse people 
appear to be motivated by a desire for security whereas 
risk seeking people appear to be motivated by a desire for 
potential.” Furthermore “in mathematical terms, security 
motivation corresponds to weighting the worst outcomes 
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in a lottery more heavily than the best outcomes and 
potential motivation corresponds to the opposite… 
Second weights reflect individual’s goals and not their 
perception of probabilities or values.” (p.18) “The theory 
puts risk seekers and risk averse people on equal footing. 
Although their choices may differ profoundly, their choice 
processes have more similarities than differences. They 
understand risk in the same way (cumulatively) and 
trade off the same factors. Their goals may differ, but 
they have the same conceptual equipment.” (p.24) The 
second factor is the aspiration level, a “situational 
variable that reflects the opportunity at hand (“What can 
I get?”) as well as the constraints imposed by the 
environment (“What do I need?”).” (p.19) The aspiration 
level can reflect 3 different sources, the direct assessment 
of what is reasonable or safe to hope for, the direct 
contextual influence of the alternatives in the choice set 
and finally the outside influence. There can be conflict 
between security/potential and aspiration level. For 
security motivated people for gains there is a positive 
correlation between security and aspiration, while there 
is a conflict between security and aspiration for losses. 
For potential motivated persons for gains potential and 
aspiration seem to be negatively correlated and losses 
seem to be positively correlated.  
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Experiments show that in virtually every case, the lottery 
judged to be riskier was the one whose Lorenz curve lay 
further from the diagonal at the low end. The risk seeking 
people preferred lotteries whose Lorenz curves lay far 
from the diagonal at the high end. According to Lopes 
(1986) “subjects tend to evaluate lotteries in terms of 
inequalities.” (p.17) To the extent that the tickets for the 
lotteries have unequal prizes, the Lorenz curve bows 
away from the diagonal. “Lorenz curves are convenient for 
lotteries cumulatively and for comparing lotteries 
selectively on either low or high outcomes. They also 
highlight differences and similarities among lotteries that 
are not immediately apparent by direct inspection of the 
lotteries.” (p.13) Lopes (1986) presents protocols: “Notice 
the inequalities: the keynote of these protocols in the 
cumulative likelihood of meeting or exceeding a goal (e.g., 
“greater chances of winning a little something,””a good 
chance of winning $71 or more,” “do better than the 
best”) The protocols also suggest that the subjects are 
mostly concerned about doing badly (getting zero or a 
small amount.” (p.13) According to Lopes (1986): 
“Moment models have major difficulties. Some of these 
are technical as, for instance, the fact that, subjectively 
speaking, risk doesn’t act like variances. More serious, 
however, is that such theories implicitly assume that 
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moments have independent psychological reality. That 
seems doubtful except for the simplest comparisons.” 
(p.12)       
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X. Group Polarization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Darling I don’t know why I go to extremes, too high or 
too low there ain’t no in-between.” 
Billy Joel, I Go To Extremes, Storm Front (1989) 
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Interestingly there is the tendency in groups after group 
internal discussions to decide more extremely than one 
would expect observing their initial position. This is quite 
surprisingly because one would expect a movement 
towards the mean.  
Moderate feminists became stronger feminists after a 
group discussion (Myers 1975). The difference between a 
group with strong racists and a group with little 
prejudices became stronger after discussions (Myers und 
Bishop 1970). Johnson and Andrews (1971) present that 
products which led to a high desire were even more asked 
for after a discussion and vice versa for a product of low 
desire. A positive expectation value of a bet led to more 
risk after group discussions and vice versa for a negative 
expectation value (Davis et al. 1974). There is a clear 
polarization towards risk for the stock market (Deets und 
Hoyt 1970). For an overall view see Myers und Lamm 
(1976).  
The first studies look primarily at risk. The participants 
answered a Choice Dilemmas Questionaire. The 
individual has to decide how likely a risky alternative has 
to be to finally choose it (Kogan und Wallach 1964). 
Regularly a risky shift was observed after group 
discussions. But one can also observe a conservative 
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shift if this was the dominated direction before the 
discussion. So the term group polarization (for instance 
Moscovici and Zavalloni 1969). Regarding the dominated 
direction the neutral point lied between 60 and 70 
percent. Under 60 percent there one can observe a 
tendency towards risk, over 70 percent a tendency 
towards caution (Myers und Aronson 1972). Teger und 
Pruitt (1967) show that a stronger movement towards 
risk depended on the number of group members (minimal 
movement for 3 members, moderate movement for 4 
members, huge movement for 5 members). The initial 
position and the strength of movement were highly 
influenced by the considered problem. 
Regarding the phenomenon of group polarization there 
exist many different theories, of which we will present the 
most important now.  
Burnstein and Vinokur (1977) propagated the so called 
model of persuasive arguments, saying that the position 
of an individual is a function of the number and the 
persuasiveness of the remembered arguments. From a 
cultural pool of arguments some are remembered, which 
differ in their availability, direction and persuasiveness. 
The persuasiveness depends on the validity and the 
novelty character according to Burnstein (1982). A new 
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argument can lead to a complete turnaround. The 
discussion will lead to the alternative which has more 
and better arguments in the group. The initial positions 
already having a direction will finally move further in this 
direction. 
Contrary we have the model of social comparison 
(Sanders und Baron 1977). It is based on the assumption 
that individuals wanted to be perceived advantageously. 
Having detected a direction they will try to become the 
avant-garde and take a more extreme position. Teger und 
Pruitt (1967) show that the bare information about the 
position of other group members led to a substantial 
movement towards risk. For other evidence see  
Blascovich et al. (1975). Goethals and Zanna (1979) show 
that the perceived similarity of the group members 
influences the polarization. The stronger the similarity, 
the more polarization.  
Here two important forms of this theory. 
Firstly the plurastic ignorance theory (Levinger and 
Schneider 1969). Humans show compromises between 
the tendency to follow one’s own ideal and not to deviate 
from the group. Because the group norm is 
underestimated before the discussion, we can observe the 
polarization after the discussion. 
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Secondly now let us turn to the release-theory (Pruitt 
1969). Pruitt (1969) stresses the conflict between 
attractive risk seeking behavior and reason. That another 
person takes an extreme position releases the individual 
from the social chains of restraint (see Asch 1952). The 
opinion of the most risk seeking individual becomes the 
model for the other group members.  
Myers (1973) show that the own ideal is more extreme 
than the group average. Other studies present the 
following result. Individuals who have a more extreme 
opinion are socially more reputable (Baron et al. 1973; 
Jellison and Davis 1973). Ferguson and Vidmar (1971) 
show that only the individuals with a moderate position 
move and the individuals with the extreme opinion stay 
the same. 
Finally Isenberg (1986) concludes after viewing 21 studies 
that both theories, the theory of persuasive arguments 
and the theory of social comparison, are responsible for 
the phenomenon of group polarization, while the first 
stronger.  
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XI. Extreme Value Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Verbindet die Extreme, so habt ihr die wahre Mitte“ 
Friedrich Schlegel, Ideen 
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If we interpret emotions as situation specific recall of 
extreme events self experienced or acquired by the 
observation of other individuals, it seems reasonable to 
look at the extreme value theory. Because extreme values 
are per definitionem rare events, one has to estimate 
probabilities for events, which have not been observed. 
The extreme value theory, based on asymptotic 
considerations, leads to models, which extrapolate from 
observed events to yet not observed events. Examples can 
be found in Coles (2001), for instance the maximal yearly 
sea level in Port Pirie or the minimal efficiency of chain 
link. Moreover one has to pay attention to a possible 
complex structure like the data showing a time trend or a 
short term cluster of extreme values. 
One searches for the distribution of the maximum 𝑀𝑛 
after n observations 𝑋1, 𝑋2 … 𝑋𝑛. Assuming that the n 
observations are identically and independently 
distributed with the distribution function 𝐹, we get for 
the distribution of 𝑀𝑛: 
𝑃𝑟{𝑀𝑛 ≤ 𝑧} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑋1 ≤ 𝑧, … , 𝑋𝑛 ≤ 𝑧} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑋1 ≤ 𝑧}× …×𝑃𝑟{𝑋𝑛 ≤ 𝑧} 
= {𝐹(𝑧)}𝑛 
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If we don’t know exactly the distribution of the 𝑋𝑖, we can 
try to estimate 𝐹, although knowing that little distortions 
regarding  𝐹 can strongly distort 𝐹𝑛. So we are 
approximating the distribution of the 𝑀𝑛. 
If we let run n against infinity, the 𝑀𝑛 would degenerate 
to 𝑧+, whereas 𝑧+ is the smallest value for which 𝐹(𝑧) = 1 
is valid. We can solve this approximation by the following 
normalization with constant series {𝑎𝑛 > 0} and {𝑏𝑛}: 
𝑀𝑛
∗ =
𝑀𝑛 − 𝑏𝑛
𝑎𝑛
 
One can show: If the constant series {𝑎𝑛 > 0} and {𝑏𝑛} 
exist, so that for 𝑛 → ∞ 𝑃𝑟 {
𝑀𝑛−𝑏𝑛
𝑎𝑛
≤ 𝑧} → 𝐺(𝑧) is valid, then 
the non-degenerate distribution function G must belong 
to one of the following three families of distributions: 
𝐼: 𝐺(𝑧) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝑒𝑥𝑝 [− (
𝑧 − 𝑏
𝑎
)]} ,      − ∞ < 𝑧 < ∞; 
𝐼𝐼: 𝐺(𝑧) = {
0,                                        𝑧 ≤ 𝑏;
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {− (
𝑧 − 𝑏
𝑎
)
−𝛼
} ,       𝑧 > 𝑏;
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼: 𝐺(𝑧) = {
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {− [(
𝑧 − 𝑏
𝑎
)
𝛼
]} ,         𝑧 < 𝑏;
1,                                            𝑧 ≥ 𝑏
 
This three families are known as extreme value 
distributions. They are characterized by the location 
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parameter 𝑏, the scale parameter 𝑎 and for Fréchet and 
Weibull in addition by the form parameter 𝛼. Regarding 𝑧+ 
one can observe in the case of Weibull that it has an end. 
The density decreases in the case of Gumbel contrary to 
Fréchet exponentially and not polynomially. 
With the help of Cramer-von Mises we can simplify the 
situation and write:  
𝐺(𝑧) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {− [1 + 𝜉 (
𝑧 − 𝜇
𝜎
)]
−1/𝜉
} 
Fréchet correspondents with 𝜉 > 0, Weibull with 𝜉 < 0 and 
finally Gumbel with 𝜉 = 0, interpreted as limit for 𝜉 → 0. 
The so called generalized extreme value distribution 
family is defined on the set {𝑧: 1 + 𝜉 (
𝑧−𝜇
𝜎
) > 0}, for the 
location parameter we have  −∞ < 𝜇 < +∞, for the scale 
parameter 𝜎 > 0, and finally for the form parameter −∞ <
𝜉 < +∞. Because of the generalized extreme value 
distribution family we don’t have to decide in favor of one 
of the three families when analyzing the situation. 
Now turning to the limit distribution to get an 
approximation of the distribution of the maxima we get: 
𝑃𝑟 {
𝑀𝑛 − 𝑏𝑛
𝑎𝑛
≤ 𝑧} ≈ 𝐺(𝑧) 
So we get also: 
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𝑃𝑟{𝑀𝑛 ≤ 𝑧} ≈ 𝐺 {
(𝑧 − 𝑏𝑛)
𝑎𝑛
} = 𝐺∗(𝑧) 
Whereas 𝐺∗(𝑧) belongs to the family of generalized 
extreme value distribution. So we have found the 
approximation of the distribution of the maxima.  
This leads to the following block method to estimate the 
parameters. We shape m blocks with n observations. 
Often the observations of a year become a block. There is 
a trade-off between distortion and variance. If the blocks 
are too small the approximation of the distribution of the 
maxima by 𝐺(𝑧) leads to strong distortions. Larger blocks 
have too few values for  𝑀𝑛 leading to an increasing 
variance. 
The log-likelihood of the parameters of the generalized 
extreme value distribution is for 𝜉 ≠ 0 assuming 
independent block maxima 𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑚 is: 
𝑙(𝜇, 𝜎, 𝜉) = −𝑚 log 𝜎 − (1 +
1
𝜉
) ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑚
𝑖=1
[1 + 𝜉 (
𝑧𝑖 − 𝜇
𝜎
)]
− ∑ [1 + 𝜉 (
𝑧𝑖 − 𝜇
𝜎
)]
−1/𝜉
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
, provided that 
1 + 𝜉 (
𝑧𝑖 − 𝜇
𝜎
) > 0, 𝑓ü𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 
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If this restriction isn’t valid the end points of the 
generalized extreme value distribution are exceeded 
respectively fall below and the probability of this 
parameter combination becomes zero.   
For  𝜉 = 0 we get: 
𝑙(𝜇, 𝜎) = −𝑚 log 𝜇 − ∑ (
𝑧𝑖 − 𝜇
𝜎
)
𝑚
𝑖=1
− ∑ exp {− (
𝑧𝑖 − 𝜇
𝜎
)}
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
Using numerical optimization algorithms we can estimate 
the parameters 𝜇, 𝜎 𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝜉, which correspond to the 
highest probability. 
The return level 𝑧𝑝 of the extreme value distribution of 
the maxima is surpassed by a probability of p. So one 
can expect that on average a surpassing can be observed 
all 
1
𝑝
 years.  
If we search for the distribution of minima  ?̃?𝑛 =
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑋1, 𝑋2 … 𝑋𝑛} in the case of identical and independent 
random variables we get: 
  
𝑃𝑟{?̃?𝑛 ≤ 𝑧} = 1 − 𝑃𝑟{𝑋1 > 𝑧, … , 𝑋𝑛 > 𝑧} 
= 1 − (𝑃𝑟{𝑋1 > 𝑧}× …×𝑃𝑟{𝑋𝑛 > 𝑧}) 
= 1 − (1 − 𝐹(𝑧))𝑛 
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If we don’t know the 𝐹(𝑧), we have to turn to the extreme 
value theory. If we write 𝑌𝑖 = −𝑋𝑖 for the 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 we get 
𝑀𝑛 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑌1, 𝑌2 … 𝑌𝑛} and finally ?̃?𝑛 = −𝑀𝑛. Moreover the 
generalized extreme value distribution for the minima is: 
?̃?(𝑧) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {− [1 + 𝜉 (
𝑧 − ?̃?
𝜎
)]
−1/𝜉
} 
, defined on {𝑧: 1 −
𝜉(𝑧−?̃?)
𝜎
> 0} with −∞ < ?̃? < +∞, σ>0,  
−∞ < 𝜉 < +∞ und ?̃? = −𝜇 
Now let us turn to both the maximum and minimum. If 
we write 𝑋(1), … , 𝑋(𝑛 ) for the order statistics (𝑋(1) ≤ 𝑋(2) ≤
⋯ ≤ 𝑋(𝑛)), of a random sample 𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛 , on basis of a 
continuous distribution function 𝐹𝑋(𝑥)  with a density  
𝑓𝑋(𝑥). For the density of 𝑋(𝑖) and 𝑋(𝑗) we get for 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤
𝑛: 
𝑓𝑋(1),𝑋(𝑛)(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)𝑓𝑋(𝑢)𝑓𝑋(𝑣)(𝐹𝑋(𝑣) − 𝐹𝑋(𝑢))
𝑛−2   
For −∞ < 𝑢 < 𝑣 < ∞ 
Because often we don’t know the distribution function 
𝐹𝑋(𝑥) we have to use approximative methods. Gumbel 
(1946) proved that the distribution of the maximum and 
the distribution of the minima can be assumed as 
independent for huge n if the following is true: 
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lim
𝑥=−∞
𝑓𝑋
′(𝑥)
𝑓𝑋(𝑥)
= lim
𝑥=−∞
𝑓𝑋(𝑥)
𝐹𝑋(𝑥)
;         lim
𝑥=∞
𝑓𝑋
′(𝑥)
𝑓𝑋(𝑥)
= − lim
𝑥=∞
𝑓𝑋(𝑥)
1 − 𝐹𝑋(𝑥)
   
It is true if the unconstrained continuous density is of 
the exponential type. Tippett (1925) showed for a 
normally distributed sample with 𝑛 ≥ 200 that the 
correlation can be neglected. So Gumbel (1947) tells us to 
depict the asymptotical distribution of the maximum and 
minimum ℎ(𝑥1, 𝑥𝑛) as product of the asymptotical 
distribution of the minimum 𝑎1(𝑥1) and the asymptotical 
distribution of the maximum 𝑎𝑛(𝑥𝑛): 
ℎ(𝑥1, 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑎1(𝑥1) ∗ 𝑎𝑛(𝑥𝑛) 
For the density of the mid range 𝑤 = 𝑋(𝑛) − 𝑋(1) we have: 
𝑔(𝑤) = 𝑛(𝑛 − 1) ∫ 𝑓𝑋(𝑦)𝑓𝑋(𝑦 + 𝑤)(𝐹𝑋(𝑦 + 𝑤) − 𝐹𝑋(𝑦))
𝑛−2𝑑𝑦
∞
−∞
 
,corresponding to the following distribution function. 
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XII. Chemical Reactions 
 
 
 
 
„Sumpf’ger Schlange Schweif und Kopf 
Brat und koch im Zaubertopf: 
Molchesaug und Unkenzehe; 
Hundemaul und Hirn der Krähe; 
Zäher Saft des Bilsenkrauts, 
Eidechsbein und Flaum vom Kauz; 
Mächt’ger Zauber würzt die Brühe, 
Höllenbrei im Kessel glühe!“ 
 
William Shakespeare, Macbeth, S.49 
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Target of the chemistry is to attribute macroscopically 
observable reaction rates and mechanisms to elementary 
microscopically processes. At centre are the chemical 
reaction rates, the time rates of change of the 
concentration, which depend on the temperature, the 
pressure, the volume, the concentration of the reactants 
and on the existence of a catalyst.  
It’s assumed that the macroscopic reaction rate can 
completely be described by unimolecular, bimolecular 
and termolecular microscopic reactions.  
In the case of unimolecular reactions a single molecule 
reacts (𝐴 → 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠). Because the change of the number 
of products will be proportional to the number of A, we 
get the following reaction of first order:   
𝑑[𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠]
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑑[𝐴]
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑘[𝐴] 
In the case of bimolecular reactions we can observe the 
collision of two molecules (𝐴 + 𝐵 → 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠). So because 
the change of products is proportional to the number of 
possible collisions we observe the following reaction of 
second order: 
𝑑[𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠]
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑑[𝐴]
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑘[𝐴][𝐵] 
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Finally we come to the termolecular reactions (𝐴 + 𝐵 +
𝐶 → 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠). We can observe the reaction of third order: 
  
𝑑[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑘𝑡𝑒]
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑑[𝐴]
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑘[𝐴][𝐵][𝐶] 
A termolecular reaction can often be seen as two 
bimolecular reactions.  
If we look at living cells the description of the 
concentration change as deterministic system seems 
dubious because of the small number of reactants (not 
more than1000). So we have to replace the continuous 
differentiable concentration function by a stepwise 
stochastic increase to incorporate the fluctuations. This 
description can be especially important in nonlinear 
systems with chemical instabilities. We observe a 
Markovian random walk in the N-dimensional space of N 
molecules. 
The fundamental hypothesis, which forms the basis of 
the stochastic formulation of chemical kinetics, is that we 
can define a parameter 𝑐𝜇 in the following way (Gillespie 
1976): 𝑐𝜇𝛿𝑡 is defined as the average probability, to first 
order in  𝛿𝑡, that a particular combination of 𝑅𝜇 reactant 
molecules react accordingly in the next time interval 𝛿𝑡.  
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ℎ𝜇(𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝑁) is the number of different combinations of 
the 𝑅𝜇 reactant molecules, if there are exactly 𝑛𝑖 of 𝑆𝑖 
molecules and that 𝑋𝑖(𝑡) is the number of molecules of 
species 𝑆𝑖 in the system at time t (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁). 
Gillespie (1992) proved the following theorems. Firstly, if 
𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑛, then the probability that there is exactly one 𝑅𝜇 
reaction in the system in the time interval [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡) is 
equal to 𝑐𝜇ℎ𝜇(𝑛)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑜(𝑑𝑡), whereas  𝑜(𝑑𝑡) strives faster 
against zero then dt. 
Secondly, if 𝑋(𝑡) = 𝑛, then the probability that there is no 
reaction in the time interval [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡) is equal to 1 −
∑  𝑐𝜇ℎ𝜇(𝑛)𝑑𝑡𝜇 + 𝑜(𝑑𝑡).  
Thirdly the probability that there is more than one 
reaction in the system in the interval [𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡) is equal to 
𝑜(𝑑𝑡). 
The physical basis for the collision probability is the 
following three assumptions. Firstly the system is 
spatially homogenous, an uniform distribution of the 
molecules in the volume V. Secondly the distribution of 
the kinetic energy is Maxwell-Boltzmann distributed. And 
finally there should be by far more elastic pushes than 
inelastic. 
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This all leads to the master-equation, which describes the 
change of probability 𝑃(𝒏, 𝑡) of a vector of n molecules by 
a gain-loss balance, whereas the transition probabilities  
𝜏𝒏𝒏′ are equal to the probability of change from a state  𝒏
′  
towards a state  𝒏: 
𝜕𝑃(𝒏, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
= ∑ 𝜏𝒏𝒏′𝑃(𝒏
′, 𝑡) − 𝜏𝒏′𝒏𝑃(𝒏, 𝑡)
𝒏′
 
Using the step operator 𝑬, we can simplify the notation. 𝑬 
increases in the case of 𝐸𝑖
𝑘 the variable i of the function 
𝑓(𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑖 , … ) by k: 
          𝐸𝑖
𝑘  𝑓(𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑖 , … ) = 𝑓(𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑘, … ) 
Moreover we present the stoichiometric matrix 𝑺 whose 
components describe the rise or fall of the molecule i in 
the case of reaction j. The reaction j leads in the i 
molecule to 𝑆𝑖𝑗: 𝑛𝑖
𝜈𝑗
→ 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖𝑗. The vector 𝝂 describes the 
reaction rates. This leads to the following master 
equation with R reactions and N molecules:  
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑡
= 𝛺 ∑ [(∏ 𝐸𝑖
−𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
) − 1] 𝜈𝑗 (
𝒏
𝜴
) 𝑃(𝒏, 𝑡)
𝑅
𝑗=1
 
For the number of molecules n, the density X and the 
system size 𝛺 we can observe the following function: 
𝑛 = 𝛺 ∗ 𝑋 
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If we look at the density 
𝑛𝑖
𝛺
= 𝑥𝑖  the deterministic rate 
equation becomes: 
𝑑𝒙
𝑑𝑡
= lim
𝛺→∞
𝑺 ∗ 𝝂 
The microscopic and macroscopic reaction rates differ a 
little bit. Let us take the reaction 2𝐴 + 𝐵 → 𝐶, the reaction 
rate is proportional to (𝐴 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ (𝐴 − 1)). Macroscopially we 
ignore this connection (𝐴2𝐵).  
To solve master equations with nonlinear transition 
probabilities, we can use numerical simulations 
(Gillespie, 1976/1977), which leads to trajectories of the 
probability distribution 𝑃(𝑛, 𝑡). If we simulate a huge 
number of paths we get a better or worse approximation 
of 𝑃(𝑛, 𝑡) dependent of the number of simulations.  
The „direct“ method by Gillespie isn’t based on the 
probability distribution 𝑃(𝑛, 𝑡) but on the reaction 
probability density function 𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗)𝑑𝜏, therefore on the 
probability in t that the next reaction is in the time 
interval (𝑡 + 𝜏, 𝑡 + 𝜏 + 𝑑𝜏) and the reaction is 𝑅𝑗. The 
algorithm delivers a pair (𝜏, 𝑗) on basis of the common 
probability density 𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗). So we get the exact time 
development of the system. 
97 
 
The approach of Gillespie uses contrary to the reaction 
rate 𝜈𝑗 (
𝒏
𝜴
) the function 𝑔𝑗(𝒏) =  𝑐𝑗ℎ𝑗(𝑛), which one can get 
by simply multiplying 𝛺 ∗ 𝜈𝑗 (
𝒏
𝜴
) = 𝑔𝑗(𝒏).  
On basis of the reaction rate 𝑔𝑗 we get a probability 
distribution, which determines the time τ for the next 
jump and also a probability distribution, which 
determines the next reaction of the j reactions. Then the 
time will be changed to 𝑡 + 𝜏 and the state to 𝑛𝑖
𝑔𝑗
→ 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖𝑗. 
The probability that one can observe a 𝑅𝑗 reaction in the 
next time interval (𝑡 + 𝜏, 𝑡 + 𝜏 + 𝑑𝜏) is equal to  𝑐𝑗ℎ𝑗(𝑛)𝑑𝜏. 
The probability of none jumps in (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝜏) is: 
P0(𝜏) = exp [−𝑎(𝒏)𝜏] 
, with  
[∑ 𝑔𝑗(𝒏)
𝑁
𝑗=1
]  ≡ 𝑎(𝒏) 
 So we get 𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗): 
𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗) = 𝑔𝑗(𝒏) exp [−𝑎(𝒏)𝜏] 
Moreover on basis of the conditional probability: 
𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗) = 𝑃1(𝜏)𝑃2(𝑗|𝜏) 
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The probability 𝑃1(𝜏), that there is a reaction between 𝑡 +
𝜏 and 𝑡 + 𝜏 + 𝑑𝜏 is: 
𝑃1(𝜏) = ∑ 𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
The probability 𝑃2(𝑗|𝜏) that the next reaction is of type j 
is: 
𝑃2(𝑗|𝜏) = 𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗)/ ∑ 𝑃(𝜏, 𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
Finally we get: 
𝑃1(𝜏) = 𝑎(𝒏) exp[−𝑎(𝒏)𝜏]                      (0 ≤ 𝜏 < ∞) 
𝑃2(𝑗|𝜏) =
𝑔𝑗(𝒏)
𝑎(𝒏)
                                       (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽) 
The probability 𝑃1(𝜏) can be simulated with help of a 
uniformly between 0 and 1 distributed random number 
𝑠1. So we get for 𝜏: 
𝜏 =
1
𝑎(𝒏)
ln (
1
𝑠1
) 
The distribution 𝑃2(𝑗|𝜏) can also be simulated on basis of 
a uniformly between 0 and 1 distributed random number 
𝑠2: 
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1
𝑎(𝒏)
∑ 𝑔𝑗(𝒏)
𝜑
j
> 𝑠2 
The first number 𝜑 for which the inequality is fulfilled 
describes the reaction in 𝑡 + 𝜏 leading to an increase of 
𝑆𝑖𝑗. 
If the model depends on the temperature it’s possible to 
include this feature by renewing the reaction parameter 
each period. But it’s required that the change of 
temperature is only small (Gillespie, 1976). 
Examples of the jump processes are predator-prey 
models or the „Brusselator“ (Gillespie 1977). 
Let us look at the model of Volterra with 𝑌1 as prey and 𝑌2 
as predator: 
𝑑𝑌1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐1𝑋𝑌1 − 𝑐2𝑌1𝑌2 
𝑑𝑌2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑐2𝑌1𝑌2 − 𝑐3𝑌2 
The equilibrium is: 
𝑌1𝑠 =
𝑐3
𝑐2
  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌2𝑠 =
𝑐1𝑋
𝑐2
  
For the parameter values of 𝑐1𝑋 = 10, 𝑐2 = 0.01, 𝑐3 = 10 one 
can observe strong oscillations, a changing amplitude 
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and a stable frequency in the case of 𝑌1𝑠 = 1000 and 𝑌2𝑠 =
1000. An increase of the number of prey leads to an 
increase of the number of predators until the number of 
prey decreases and so does the number of predators. In 
the deterministic case the solution is neutral stable, one 
can observe a closed orbit. Gillespie (1977) describes the 
observed behavior as „drunkard’s walk“ about the 
continuum of concentric, neutral stable solution orbits. 
Neutral stable solutions lead in the case of a stochastic 
observation to one of two absorbing states, (𝑌1 = 0, 𝑌2 = 0) 
or (𝑌1 = ∞, 𝑌2 = 0). 
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XIII. Ants, Van Kampen and the Socio 
Dynamics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Die Meinungen der Menschen, ihre geistige Haltung, 
sind für die Richtung der Wirtschaftspolitik vielfach 
wichtiger als die wirtschaftliche Tatsache selbst.“ 
Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (2008) 
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  The first of three in the following presented models is 
the model of Kirman (1993). Deneubourg et al. (1987) 
and Pasteels et al. (1987) show that ants in the case of 
foraging in a symmetric situation act asymmetrically and 
firstly plunder one of two identical, constantly restocked, 
food sources, but change later to the other food source. 
The same phenomenon was seen for the usage of two 
different ways to the food source. So Kirman (1993) 
assumed that such a behavior is based on the interaction 
of the group members and can’t be explained by looking 
at an isolated ant. So such a herd behavior can explain 
the volatility of the stock exchange.  
According to the criticism by Gould and Lewontin (1979) 
that the optimality is overemphasized in the biological 
context, because surviving does not mean optimality and 
there could exist local optimality preventing evolution.  
Let us now turn to the model. There exist two food 
sources a black and a white one. N ants visit the black or 
white one. The system state is defined by the number k 
which visit the black food source, so we have 
𝑘 ∈ (0,1, … , 𝑁) 
We pick two ants at random of which the first picked ant 
takes over the opinion of the second ant with the 
probability (1-𝛿). But the first picked ant changes its 
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opinion also autonomously with the probability ε, so that 
we prevent a latching in the case of k=0 and k=N. The 
connection between δ and ε can be described in the 
following way. Firstly the ant changes its opinion 
autonomously with the probability ε, if that doesn’t 
happens the ant takes over the opinion of the other ant 
with probability γ. So δ is equal to (1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾𝜀). The 
autonomous opinion swing is based on exogenous 
information or the exchange of ants. In a small time 
interval we can observe the following change of k: 
𝑘 → {
𝑘 + 1,   𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑃(𝑘 → 𝑘 + 1) = 𝑝1
          𝑘,         𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑃(𝑘 → 𝑘) = 1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝2
𝑘 − 1,   𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑃(𝑘 → 𝑘 − 1) = 𝑝2  
      
Moreover we get: 
    𝑝1 = 𝑃(𝑘 → 𝑘 + 1) =
𝑁 − 𝑘
𝑁
(𝜀 + (1 − 𝛿)
𝑘
𝑁 − 1
) 
𝑝2 = 𝑃(𝑘 → 𝑘 − 1) =
𝑘
𝑁
(𝜀 + (1 − 𝛿)
𝑁 − 𝑘
𝑁 − 1
) 
For ε=0.5 and δ=1 we get the Ehrenfest urn model with a 
stationary distribution which is binomially distributed: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘) = 𝐵(𝑘; 0.5; 𝑁) = (
𝑁
𝑘
) 0.5𝑁 
ε=0 leads to the final state k=N or k=0, whereas the 
probability of k=N with an initial state 𝑘0 is equal to 𝑘0/𝑁. 
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The stationary distribution has the following 
characteristics. For a strong autonomous part 𝜀 >
1−𝛿
𝑁−1
 we 
get an unimodal distribution round k=N/2. For a relative 
strong herd part  𝜀 <
1−𝛿
𝑁−1
 the distribution is bimodal and 
the probability is concentrated round k=0 and k=N. 
Finally for 𝜀 =
1−𝛿
𝑁−1
 we get an uniform distribution. Föllmer 
proved that the continuous limit distribution in the case 
of 𝑁 → ∞ and 𝜀 = 𝛼/𝑁 and 𝛿 = 2𝛼/N is equal to the 
symmetric beta distribution. 
Because herd behavior can in reality generate a positive 
rent according to Kirman (1993) this should strengthen 
the observed herd behavior. Moreover it seems hard to 
hedge one against a change of opinion because we have a 
memoryless Markov process and so can’t predict exactly 
the consequences of an opinion swing.  
The influence of another individual can be explained in 
the following way. The individual could be convinced that 
the other one has superior abilities, because conformism 
has a positive externality or because the other one is a 
sample.  
De la Lama et al. (2006) distinguish in their opinion 
model based on the „Linear Noise Approximation“ by Van 
Kampen (2007) three parties, A, B and the irresolute I. 
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They assume the following changes of opinion: 𝐼 ⇆ 𝐴 
und 𝐼 ⇆ 𝐵. The number of followers of A is 𝑁𝐴, the number 
of followers of B is 𝑁𝐵 and the number of irresolute 
individuals I is equal to 𝑁𝐼. The reaction equations are: 
 
𝐴 → 𝐼 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝛼1𝑁𝐴 
𝐼 → 𝐴 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝛼2𝑁𝐼 
𝐵 → 𝐼 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝛼3𝑁𝐵 
𝐼 → 𝐵 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝛼4𝑁𝐼 
𝐴 + 𝐼 → 2𝐴 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝛽1
𝛺
𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐼 
𝐵 + 𝐼 → 2𝐵 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝛽2
𝛺
𝑁𝐵𝑁𝐼 
Because of the constraint 𝑁𝐴 + 𝑁𝐵 + 𝑁𝐼 = 𝑁 we can write 
for 𝑁𝐼: 𝑁𝐼 = (𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴 − 𝑁𝐵). So we get the following master-
equation: 
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𝜕
𝜕𝑡
𝑃(𝑁𝐴, 𝑁𝐵 , 𝑡)
= 𝛼1(𝑁𝐴 + 1)𝑃(𝑁𝐴 + 1, 𝑁𝐵 , 𝑡 )
+ 𝛼3(𝑁𝐵 + 1)𝑃(𝑁𝐴, 𝑁𝐵 + 1, 𝑡 )
+ 𝛼2(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴 − 𝑁𝐵 + 1)𝑃(𝑁𝐴 − 1, 𝑁𝐵 , 𝑡)
+ 𝛼4(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴 − 𝑁𝐵 + 1)𝑃(𝑁𝐴, 𝑁𝐵 − 1, 𝑡)
+
𝛽1
𝛺
(𝑁𝐴 − 1)(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴 − 𝑁𝐵 + 1)𝑃(𝑁𝐴 − 1, 𝑁𝐵 , 𝑡)
+
𝛽2
𝛺
(𝑁𝐵 − 1)(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴 − 𝑁𝐵 + 1)𝑃(𝑁𝐴, 𝑁𝐵 − 1, 𝑡)
− [𝛼1𝑁𝐴 + 𝛼3𝑁𝐵 + 𝛼2(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴 − 𝑁𝐵)
+ 𝛼4(𝑁 − 𝑁𝐴 − 𝑁𝐵 + 1)𝑃(𝑁𝐴, 𝑁𝐵 , 𝑡)] 
Now to the results. For the symmetric case 𝛼1 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼, 
𝛼2 = 𝛼4 = 𝛼
′ und 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽 one can show that the 
expectation value of the fluctuations 〈𝜉𝐴(𝑡)〉 = 𝜂𝐴 and 
〈𝜉𝐵(𝑡)〉 = 𝜂𝐵 of the stationary solution strives for 𝑡 → ∞ 
against zero. For the correlations of the fluctuations we 
have  𝜎𝐴 = 〈𝜉𝐴(𝑡)
2〉,  𝜎𝐵 = 〈𝜉𝐵(𝑡)
2〉 and 𝜎𝐴𝐵 = 〈𝜉𝐴(𝑡)𝜉𝐵(𝑡)〉 for 
𝑡 → ∞  𝜎𝑖
𝑠𝑡 ≠ 0 (𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐴𝐵). 
The macroscopic behavior is described, with 𝜌 =
𝑁
𝛺
= 1, 
by: 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝛹𝐴 = −𝛼1𝛹𝐴 + [𝛼2 + 𝛽1𝛹𝐴](𝜌 − 𝛹𝐴 − 𝛹𝐵) 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝛹𝐵 = −𝛼3𝛹𝐵 + [𝛼4 + 𝛽2𝛹𝐵](𝜌 − 𝛹𝐴 − 𝛹𝐵) 
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One can show that there exists only one stationary 
solution. 
𝛹𝐴(𝑡 → ∞) = 𝛹𝐴
𝑠𝑡 
𝛹𝐵(𝑡 → ∞) = 𝛹𝐵
𝑠𝑡 
We can write for the fluctuations: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑡
𝛱(𝜉𝐴, 𝜉𝐵 , 𝑡)
=
𝜕
𝜕𝜉𝐴
[(𝛼1𝜉𝐴 + (𝛼2 + 𝛽1𝛹𝐴)(𝜉𝐴 + 𝜉𝐵)
− 𝛽1𝜉𝐴(𝜌 − 𝛹𝐴 − 𝛹𝐵))𝛱(𝜉𝐴, 𝜉𝐵 , 𝑡)]
+
𝜕
𝜕𝜉𝐵
[(𝛼3𝜉𝐵 + (𝛼4 + 𝛽2𝛹𝐵)(𝜉𝐴 + 𝜉𝐵)
− 𝛽2𝛹𝐵(𝜌 − 𝛹𝐴 − 𝛹𝐵))𝛱(𝜉𝐴, 𝜉𝐵 , 𝑡)]
+
1
2
[𝛼1𝛹𝐴 + [𝛼2 + 𝛽1𝛹𝐴](𝜌 − 𝛹𝐴 − 𝛹𝐵)]
𝜕2
𝜕𝜉𝐴
2 𝛱(𝜉𝐴, 𝜉𝐵 , 𝑡)
+
1
2
[𝛼3𝛹𝐵 + [𝛼4
+ 𝛽2𝛹𝐵](𝜌 − 𝛹𝐴 − 𝛹𝐵)]
𝜕2
𝜕𝜉𝐵
2 𝛱(𝜉𝐴, 𝜉𝐵 , 𝑡) 
If one increases the population from 100 to 1000 one can 
see that the fluctuations decrease. In an example De la 
Lama et al. (2006) show that the probability to win the 
election decreases from 25.7% in the case of a population 
of 100 to 1.5% in the case of a population of 1000. The 
probability decreases in such a case proportional to 𝑁−1. 
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The socio dynamics tries to model dynamic processes for 
many social systems and uses concepts which are known 
to us from the chapters before. We will present now an 
approach in an economic context created by Lux (1995). 
Criticizing the efficient market hypothesis (West 1988) 
Lux (1995) presents a model for herd behavior, 
emphasizing sociological and psychological aspects. One 
can observe parallels to the model of Kirman (1993). Lux 
(1995) wanted to describe the behavior of noise-traders 
and to integrate the observation of a mean-reversion of 
stock prices (Poterba und Summers 1988).  
Let us look at the model for the dynamic development of 
two opinions, one optimistic one pessimistic (see also 
Weidlich und Haag 1983). Lux (1995) assumes traders 
who have only one source of information namely their 
colleagues. So following the herd doesn’t seem too 
irrational. Dependent on the opinion of the agent we have 
dynamically changing transition probabilities. At the 
centre we have the Geschäftsklimaindex 𝑥𝑡: 
𝑥𝑡 =
𝑛𝑡
𝑁
=
𝑛𝑡
+ − 𝑛𝑡
−
2𝑁
 
There exist 2N group members, of which 𝑛𝑡
+ are in a 
positive mood and 𝑛𝑡
− are in a negative mood. The moods 
can change by jump processes. Pessimists change to 
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optimists with the individual transition rate 𝑝↑, optimists 
change to pessimists with the individual transition rate 
𝑝↓. Moreover the transition probabilities depend on the 
number of optimists respectively pessimists and are 
equal for the individuals. We get the following equation 
system: 
𝑑𝑛𝑡
+ = 𝑛𝑡
−𝑝↑𝑑𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡
+𝑝↓𝑑𝑡 
𝑑𝑛𝑡
− = 𝑛𝑡
+𝑝↓𝑑𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡
−𝑝↑𝑑𝑡 
The rates of the transition probability are: 
𝑝↑ = 𝑣 exp(𝑈),              𝑝↓ = 𝑣 exp(−𝑈) 
For U we have: 
𝑈 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑥 
An increase in 𝑣 increases the transition rates, the 𝛼0 
distorts the model regarding the opinions and 𝛼1 
determines the degree of conformism.  
We get the following differential equation (see also  
Weidlich 2006): 
?̇? = 𝜈[(1 − 𝑥) exp(𝑈) − (1 + 𝑥)exp (−𝑈)] 
We can observe the following results: 
1) For 𝛼1 ≤ 1 there exists a single stable equilibrium at 
𝑥 = 0 
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2) For 𝛼1 > 1 we get two additional stable equilibrium 
with 𝑥+ > 0 and 𝑥− < 0, whereas 𝑥 = 0 isn’t stable 
anymore  
We get the following master-equation: 
𝑑𝑃(𝑛; 𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑤↑(𝑛 − 1)𝑃(𝑛 − 1; 𝑡) + 𝑤↓(𝑛 + 1)𝑃(𝑛 + 1; 𝑡)]
− [𝑤↑(𝑛)𝑃(𝑛; 𝑡) + 𝑤↓(𝑛)𝑃(𝑛; 𝑡)] 
,whereas  
𝑤↑(𝑛/𝑁) = 𝑛−𝑝↑(𝑛/𝑁) 
𝑤↓(𝑛/𝑁) = 𝑛+𝑝↓(𝑛/𝑁) 
Now turn to the following results (Weidlich und Haag 
1983): 
1) For 𝛼1 ≤ 1 we get a stationary distribution with a 
single maximum, which shifts dependent on 𝛼0. 
2) For 𝛼1 > 1 and small 𝛼0, we get two maxima with 
𝑥+ > 0 and 𝑥− < 0, whereas 𝛼0 influences the Schiefe 
and the concentration of the probability mass. 
3) If |𝛼0| increases over the bifurcation value 𝛼0̅̅ ̅ 
𝑐𝑜𝑠ℎ2(𝛼0̅̅ ̅ − √𝛼1(𝛼1 − 1)) the bimodal distribution 
becomes unimodal 
4) The mean escape time depends on the number of 
agents 
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The above propagated Langevin-equation is valid exactly 
for an infinite population. The dynamics in case of a finite 
population are badly depicted by it, especially when there 
are multiple equilibriums. 
Now Lux (1995) includes dynamic share prices to depict 
the volatility of the markets. 
At every time a trader can buy or sell a fixed number of 
shares. An optimistic trader buys 𝑡𝑁 shares, while a 
pessimistic one sells 𝑡𝑁 shares. We get a demand 𝐷𝑁: 
                        𝐷𝑁 = 𝑛+𝑡𝑁 − 𝑛−𝑡𝑁 = 2𝑛𝑡𝑁  
Because we have 𝑛 = 𝑁𝑥 we can write: 
𝐷𝑁 = 2𝑁𝑥𝑡𝑁 ,                         𝑇𝑁 ≡ 2𝑁𝑡𝑁 
 
Besides the chartists there exists the fundamentalists, 
who orient themselves by the fundamental data. Their 
demand is:  
𝐷𝐹 = 𝑇𝐹(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝),      𝑇𝐹 > 0 
The 𝑇𝐹 describes the exchange volume. A market maker 
adapts the price until the equilibrium 𝑝∗ = (
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝐹
) 𝑥 + 𝑝𝑓 is 
reached: 
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𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛽(𝐷𝑁 + 𝐷𝐹) = 𝛽[𝑥𝑇𝑁 + 𝑇𝐹(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝)] 
The change of price is incorporated in the transition 
probabilities: 
    𝑝↑ = 𝑣 exp (𝑎1
?̇?
𝑣
+ 𝑎2𝑥) ,                  𝑝↓ = 𝑣 exp (−𝑎1
?̇?
𝑣
− 𝑎2𝑥) 
The constants 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 weigh the strength of the price 
effect and the herd behavior. 
We get the following differential equation system: 
?̇? = 2𝑣 [𝑇𝑎𝑛ℎ (𝑎1
?̇?
𝑣
+ 𝑎2𝑥) − 𝑥] 𝐶𝑜𝑠ℎ(𝑎1
?̇?
𝑣
+ 𝑎2𝑥) 
?̇? = 𝛽[𝑥𝑇𝑁 + 𝑇𝐹(𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝)] 
We get the following results according to Lux (1995): 
1) A single equilibrium exists for 𝑎2 ≤ 1 at 𝐸0 = (0, 𝑝𝑓), 
two additional equilibria for 𝑎2 > 1, 𝐸+(𝑥+, 𝑝+) and 
𝐸−(𝑥−, 𝑝−). 
2) If 𝐸± exists then 𝐸0 is instable. 
3) For 𝑎2 < 1 the stability depends on the condition 
2[𝑎1𝛽𝑇𝑁 + 𝑣(𝑎2 − 1)] − 𝛽𝑇𝐹 < 0. 
4) At least one can observe one limit cycle and all 
trajectories strive against a periodic orbit, if 𝐸0 is 
single and not stable. 
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In the case of a cycle we observe negative mood and a 
falling price and in the optimistic case a positive mood 
and an increasing price, whereas we reach in both cases 
a turning point so that there is no lasting positive or 
negative majority.  
The equilibria different from zero in the case 𝑎2 > 1 are 
identical to the basic model. The generated price lies for 
𝐸+(𝑥+, 𝑝+) above the fundamental value and for 𝐸−(𝑥−, 𝑝−) 
under it. In both cases we observe trade.   
Looking at simulations one can observe for 𝑎2 > 1 and for 
a huge parameter range stable equilibria 𝑥±, moreover 
there was a case of a limit cycle in which all three 
equilibria were locked in. 
Last but not least Lux (1995) includes with 𝑎0 an 
endogenous mechanism to prevent bubbles and crisis: 
  
𝑝↑ = 𝑣 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑎0 + 𝑎1
𝑝
𝑣
̇
+ 𝑎2𝑥) 
𝑝↓ = 𝑣 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑎0 − 𝑎1
𝑝
𝑣
̇
−𝑎2𝑥) 
The variable 𝑎0 depends on the difference of rents (𝑟 +
?̇?)/𝑝, with r as constant dividend, and the average 
expected rents R: 
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𝑑𝑎0
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜏[
(𝑟 + 𝜏−1?̇?)
𝑝
− 𝑅] 
If 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑓 + (
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝐹
)𝑥, therefore if there is market clearance, 
then we get the following differential equation system, 
assuming additionally 
𝑟
𝑝𝑓
= 𝑅: 
?̇? = 2𝑣[𝑇𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑥) − 𝑥]𝐶𝑜𝑠ℎ(𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝑥) 
?̇?0 = 𝜏{[𝑟 + 𝑟
−1 (
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝐹
) ?̇?] / [𝑝𝑓 + (
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝐹
)𝑥] − 𝑅} 
We get the following results: 
1) There exist a single equilibrium at 𝐸 = (0,0) 
2) The equilibrium is stable (not stable) for 𝑎2 − 1 +
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝐹
𝑝𝑓
<
(>)0 
3) In the not stable case there exist at least one limit 
cycle to which all trajectories converge 
In the case of a cycle we notice that falling (increasing) 
rents lead to a falling number of optimists (pessimists) 
until we observe a crisis (bubble). 
Lux (1995) bases his work on the following macroscopic 
equation. We have for the average < 𝑌 >, with 𝑊(𝑦′|𝑦) as 
transition probability per unit time from y to 𝑦′: 
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𝑑
𝑑𝑡
< 𝑌 >= ∫ 𝑦
𝜕𝑃(𝑦, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
𝑑𝑦 
≈ ∬(𝑦′ − 𝑦)𝑊(𝑦′|𝑦)𝑃(𝑦, 𝑡)𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑦′ 
Now let’s define the jump moments 𝑎𝑣(𝑦)  
𝑎𝑣(𝑦) = ∫(𝑦
′ − 𝑦)𝑣𝑊(𝑦′|𝑦) 𝑑𝑦′        (𝑣 = 0,1,2 … ) 
The exact consequence of the master-equation is 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
< 𝑌 >= ∫ 𝑎1(𝑦)𝑃(𝑦, 𝑡)𝑑𝑦 =< 𝑎1(𝑌) > 
If 𝑎1(𝑦) is a linear equation then we get 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
< 𝑌 >= 𝑎1(< 𝑌 >) 
If 𝑎1(𝑦) is a non linear equation one has  
< 𝑎1(𝑌) >= 𝑎1(< 𝑌 >) +
1
2
< (𝑌−< 𝑌 >)2 > 𝑎1
′′(< 𝑌 >) … 
The evolution of < 𝑌 > depends on fluctuations around 
this average, it is not a closed equation for < 𝑌 > for 
higher moments enter. Ignoring these fluctuations the 
result is Lux (1995) with his model of good and bad 
mood.  
We opt for an agent-based model with a numerical 
simulation of moods or modes, extended by emotions. So 
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we aren’t able to present an analytical model like Lux 
(1995) which connects the above presented dynamical 
model of moods with a simple price building framework 
based on chartists and fundamentalists as we have 
already seen. But including emotions, respectively the 
extremes in our life, we can get a far more precise model 
of what happens if we are in a good, bad or neutral mood 
respectively mode, in much wider circumstances. It 
destroys the frontier between psychology, with its 
emphasis on trauma, and economics and leads hopefully 
to a better understanding of the world with its rationality 
and its emotions. 
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XIV. Prospect Theory, Disappointment Theory 
and Emotion-based Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
“Men believe themselves to be free, simply because they 
are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the 
causes whereby those actions are determined.” 
B. Spinoza, Ethics, Works of Spinoza, New York: Dover, 
1955  
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The expected utility theory dominates both as normative 
and descriptive model of rational choice. The prospect 
theory describes an alternative descriptive theory 
(Kahneman und Tversky 1979).    
The expected utility theory is based on three pillars: 
i) Expectation: 𝑈(𝑥1, 𝑝1; … ; 𝑥𝑛, 𝑝𝑛) = 𝑢(𝑥1)𝑝1 + ⋯ +
𝑢(𝑥𝑛)𝑝𝑛 
ii) Asset Integration: (𝑥1, 𝑝1; … ; 𝑥𝑛, 𝑝𝑛) is accepted with 
wealth w only if 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑥1, 𝑝1; … ; 𝑤 + 𝑥𝑛, 𝑝𝑛) > 𝑢(𝑤) 
iii) Risk aversion: u is concave (𝑢′′ < 0) 
 
The following effects can be observed. The certainty effect 
says that humans overweigh a sure outcome relative to 
an only possible outcome. 
The reflection effect means that the reflection against zero 
reverses the preference order. We can observe risk 
aversion in the positive domain and risk seeking in the 
negative domain.  
The isolation effect says that humans don’t focus on 
common parts of prospects but on the differing parts. 
The prospect theory distinguishes two different stages. 
The editing phase consists of a temporary analysis, which 
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leads to a simplified representation. One distinguishes 
the coding of gains and losses, the fixation of a reference 
point, the combination of probabilities in the case of 
identical outcome and the separation in a risky and a 
riskless part and finally the deletion of a common first 
stage. Moreover we have the rounding of outcomes, the 
disregard of extremely improbable outcomes and the 
search for dominant prospects. 
The editing phase is followed by the evaluation stage, 
choosing the best prospect. Here the scales π(p) and v(x) 
are important. π(p) assigns to the probabilities a certain 
weight, but this isn’t a probability measure. v(x) assigns 
to the gains and losses relative to a reference point a 
subjective value.   
The v(x) is assumed to be concave above the reference 
point and under it to be convex. v(x) is steeper for losses 
than for gains.  
Now let us turn to the following two models. According to 
Bell (1985) disappointment is a psychological reaction if 
the outcome is worse than expected. The bigger the 
difference, the bigger the disappointment. Enthusiasm is 
he reaction if the outcome is better than expected. Bell 
examined the anticipation of those feelings when 
uncertain alternatives are compared by the decision 
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maker. So Bell (1985) argues that one should include 
feelings like disappointment or enthusiasm in a rational 
analysis. 
Bell (1985) presents the following simple model. A person 
owns a lottery, which pays $𝑥 with probability 𝑝 and $𝑦 
with the probability (1 − 𝑝), whereas  $𝑥 is preferred to $𝑦. 
The lottery is described by the triple (𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑦). With the 
constant 𝑑 we get disappointment as: 
 
𝑑(𝑝𝑥 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑦 − 𝑦) = 𝑑𝑝(𝑥 − 𝑦) 
With the constant e we get enthusiasm as: 
𝑒(𝑥 − 𝑝𝑥 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑦) = 𝑒(1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 − 𝑦) 
The utility is: 
𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
If 𝑑 > 𝑒, then we have for the lottery (𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑦) the certainty 
equivalent: 
𝑝𝑥 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑦 + (𝑒 − 𝑑)𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 − 𝑦) 
Bell (1985) views the part (𝑒 − 𝑑)𝑝(1 − 𝑝)(𝑥 − 𝑦) as a risk 
measure. 
Köszegi und Rabin (2005) build a model of reference 
dependent preferences. The utility of a sure outcome is 
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𝑢(𝑐|𝑟), with 𝑐 = (𝑐1, 𝑐2 … , 𝑐𝐾) ∈ 𝑅
𝐾 as consumption and 𝑟 =
(𝑟1, 𝑟2 … , 𝑟𝐾) ∈ 𝑅
𝐾 as reference level of consumption. Finally 
the utility is: 
𝑈(𝐹|𝐺) = ∫ ∫ 𝑢(𝑐|𝑟)𝑑𝐺(𝑟)𝑑𝐹(𝑐) 
, whereas the reference point is a probability measure G 
about the 𝑅𝐾 and the consumption is drawn on the basis 
of the probability measure F. 
The outcome is compared with the outcome of the 
reference lottery. If the reference lottery is a game 
between 0 and 100 dollar, the outcome of 50 dollar is a 
gain in the case of a reference of 0 dollar and a loss in the 
case of a reference of 100 dollar. The result is a mixture 
of both feelings.  
The utility has two parts, the consumption utility 𝑚(𝑐) 
and the gain-loss utility 𝑛(𝑐|𝑟): 
𝑢(𝑐|𝑟) = 𝑚(𝑐) + 𝑛(𝑐|𝑟) 
The consumption utility is additively separable between 
the dimensions, with every 𝑚𝑘(. ) differentiable and 
strictly increasing. 
Moreover we look at the universal gain-loss function 𝜇(. ) 
with properties according to Kahneman und Tversky 
(1979): 
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𝑛𝑘(𝑐𝑘|𝑟𝑘) = 𝜇(𝑚𝑘(𝑐𝑘) − 𝑚𝑘(𝑟𝑘)) 
The gain-loss utility is separable. Köszegi und Rabin 
(2005) assume that the reference point is reflected by the 
current expectations. They will be assumed as completely 
rational. A person predicts the environment and her 
reaction in the personal equilibrium and maximizes her 
utility on basis of those expectations. If a person expects 
to choose 𝐹𝑙 of a set 𝐷𝑙, then she expects the distribution 
of outcomes ∫ 𝐹𝑙𝑑𝑄(𝑙), with this reference point the person 
chooses actually 𝐹𝑙 from 𝐷𝑙.      
Because multiple personal equilibriums are possible, they 
are ordered by their ex ante expected utility (preferred 
personal equilibrium). A preferred personal equilibrium 
can’t be distinguished from a model which is solely based 
on consumption utility when the selection set of the 
decider is deterministic and the selection 
deterministically.   
Now let us turn to the emotion-based choice presented by 
Mellers et al. (1999). Firstly they talk about the minimax 
principle of risky choice based on anticipated regret by 
Savage (1951, 1954), namely that one should minimize 
the maximum regret. But as Mellers et al. (1999) explain, 
his theory was never adopted on either normative or 
descriptive grounds, because it was a violation of the 
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axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives and 
there seems to be an unrealistic degree of risk-aversion 
because of the focus on worst-case scenarios. Secondly 
they discuss the disappointment theory, whereas 
disappointment focuses, as we have already seen, on 
counterfactual comparisons across alternative states of 
the world (Loomes and Sugden 1986, Bell 1985). It forms 
the basis for their theory, Mellers et al. (1999) call it 
decision affect theory. They argue that the pleasure of an 
outcome increases when the unobtained outcome was 
worse, and that surprising wins were more pleasurable 
than expected wins, and surprising losses were more 
painful than expected losses. So they model the 
emotional response to an outcome A relative to outcome 
B as: 
𝑅𝐴 = 𝐽𝑅[𝑢𝐴 + 𝑑(𝑢𝐴 − 𝑢𝐵)(1 − 𝑠𝐴)] 
𝐽𝑅 is a linear response function that links an implicit 
feeling to a rated response. 𝑢𝐴 and 𝑢𝐵 are the utilities of 
the obtained and unobtained outcomes. d is a 
disappointment function. 𝑠𝐴 is the subjective probability.  
Mellers et al. (1999) show that the subjective expected 
pleasure theory gives a good account of choices, whereas 
maximizing the maximum pleasure and minimizing the 
maximum possible pain do poorly at describing choice. 
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But, important for us, they don’t distinguish happy, 
neutral and fearful people. Mellers et al. (1999) argue 
that maximizing subjective expected pleasure is not the 
same as maximizing subjective utilities, for instance 
emotions depend on beliefs and emotional pleasure need 
not increase with the size of the outcome.  
Furthermore Mellers et al. (1999) provide the following 
results. “The pleasure of winning and the pain of losing 
are more intense when outcomes are surprising.” (p.336) 
“The disappointment effect was so strong to make a loss 
of $8… feel slightly pleasurable.” (p.336) Moreover there 
were regret effects, so that people felt better about their 
own outcome if the outcome of another gamble was 
worse. Furthermore for the “majority of people, 
disappointment was greater than elation (61%) and regret 
was greater than rejoicing (76%).” (p.338) There was no 
evidence that people are imaging outcomes for either 
wins or losses. Looking at anticipated vs. actual emotions 
the data show that people can accurately predict their 
emotions. Emphasizing the reference point the following 
seems valid: “When counterfactual comparisons are less 
obvious, people may use a variety of the reference points 
that need not be counterfactual comparisons.” (p.342) 
“The harder it was to imagine the event, the more 
surprising the outcome and the greater the impact of the 
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counterfactual comparisons.” (p.343) Last but not least: 
“Choices based on instructions to maximize pleasure or 
minimize pain were best predicted by an average of 
anticipated feelings, but pleasurable or painful feelings 
were weighted more when instructions said to maximize 
pleasure or minimize pain respectively.” (p.343, based on 
Schwartz et al. 1999) All these results will become 
important in our theory. 
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XV. A Model 
 
 
 
 
 
“Man soll die Dinge so einfach wie möglich machen, aber 
nicht noch einfacher.“ 
Albert Einstein 
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Let’s look at the innovation process in the case of M 
firms. The 𝜏1 stands for the number of runs. We model 
the following jump processes. G means good mood, B 
means bad mood and finally N stands for neutral mood. 
𝑀𝐺 stands for the number of firms in good mood, 𝑀𝐵 
stands for the number of firms in bad mood and  𝑀𝑁 
stands for the number of firms in neutral mood.  
The following is valid: 
𝛼𝜔
𝑟 𝑑𝑡 =  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑡, 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 
 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝜔 = (𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑘) 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙   
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑟
= (?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑘)  
Moreover on the basis of the addition theorem for 
mutually excluding probabilities: 
ℎ𝜔(𝑀)𝛼𝜔
𝑟 𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑡, 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟  
𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑡 
ℎ𝜔(𝑀1, … , 𝑀𝑁) is the number of different combinations of 
the reacting people in the system, if exactly 𝑀𝑖 people are 
available.  
The theory behind this jump processes builds on the 
work of Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987). Emotions are 
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according to the conflict theory “disturbances which 
accompany interruptions and discrepancies among 
multiple goals and representations.” (Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird 1987, p.30)  But Oatley and Johnson-
Laird (1987) emphasize the cognitive functions of 
emotions: “Emotions are part of a management system to 
co-ordinate each individual’s multiple plans and goals 
under constraints of time and other limited resources.” 
(Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987, p.31) “It communicates 
junctures in mutual plans among individuals in social 
groups”. (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987, p.31) “Plans 
become mutual when one negotiates, exchanges 
knowledge, corrects misunderstandings, and enters in 
shared intentions.” (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987, 
p.44)   Moreover “emotionally toned moods can maintain 
the system in specific states, and it’s a common 
observation that episodes of emotion can occur, and 
moods can persist, long after the event that elicited then 
is past.” (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987, p.32) The 
function of these specific states, called emotional modes, 
is “to enable one priority to be exchanged for another in 
the system of multiple goals, and maintain the priority 
until it is satisfied or abandoned.” (Oatley and Johnson-
Laird 1987, p.33) There is a small number of basic 
emotion modes: happiness, sadness, anxiety (or fear), 
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anger and disgust. In our theory we observe only three 
modes, one neutral and the two emotional modes 
happiness/surprise and fear, called here positive and 
negative mood. Surprise is also an universal emotion 
according to Ekman (1973). According to Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird (1987) if the juncture of current plan 
leads to happiness that means that subgoals have been 
achieved and the state to which transition occurs is to 
continue with plans and modify it when necessary. If the 
juncture leads to anxiety there was a self-preservation 
goal threatened and the state to which transition occurs 
is to stop, attend vigilantly to the environment and/or to 
escape. In adults there is also a conscious evaluation of 
the juncture in planning, so that propositional signals 
reach the operating system which give meaning to the 
emotion and leading to voluntary action. So many 
emotions occur when planned behavior is interrupted 
and the likely success of a plan changes. The function of 
the modes is “to organize a transition to a new phase of 
planned activity directed to the priorities of the mode 
with associated goals.” (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987, 
p.35)    
The junctures are modeled in our model as a stochastic 
jump process, which leads from one mode to another. In 
the modes ambiguities have to be resolved. The decisions 
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which have to be made are whether the current plan 
should be abandoned altogether or only temporarily, 
about the levels of change, the changing of goals and the 
revising of current models of the world. The changing of 
goals will have a prominent role in our model.   
Moreover Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) emphasize the 
social aspect of emotions, “most emotions of interest to 
humans occur in the course of our relation with others” 
(Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987, p.41), needing a model 
of the self. Adult emotions are “complex founded on a 
basic, non-propositional emotion mode, but have a 
propositional evaluation which is social.” (Oatley and 
Johnson-Laird 1987, p.46) In our model the different 
emotional modes lead to different appraisal mechanisms 
as we will see later. A neutral person bases her action on 
the expectation value, while a happy/surprised person 
will focus on the chances of different alternatives and the 
fearful person will act according to the inherent risk. This 
all happens as a secondary appraisal after the primary 
appraisal with its emotion modes. 
The basis for this secondary appraisal is laid by Han et 
al. (2007), in their appraisal-tendency framework (ATF). 
They distinguished the effects of specific emotions on 
judgments and decision making, while focusing on 
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incidental emotions. The ATF is a multidimensional 
theoretical framework with valence as only one 
dimension. The most important dimensions are certainty, 
pleasantness, attentional activity, control, anticipated 
effort and responsibility. For instance anger is connected 
to an appraisal of certainty about what happened and 
individual control for negative events, while fear is 
connected to an appraisal of uncertainty about what 
happened and situational control for negative events. To 
cite Han et al. (2007): “emotions not only can arise from 
but give rise to an implicit cognitive predisposition to 
appraise future events in line with the central appraisal 
themes that characterize the emotions (emotion-to-
cognition)”. These appraisal tendencies affect content as 
well as depth of people’s thought. Raghunathan and 
Pham (1999) show that anxious people choose an option 
that reduces risk; whereas sad people choose the option 
that maximizes reward. Furthermore there is a matching 
constraint: “The influence of emotion is limited to spheres 
of judgment related to emotion’s appraisal.” (Han et al. 
2007, p.161), Finally the ATF emphasizes the 
deactivating conditions, so that “goal-attainment 
assumes that appraisal tendencies will be deactivated 
when an emotion-eliciting problem is solved”, or that “the 
cognitive-awareness hypothesis assumes that appraisal 
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tendencies will be deactivated when decision makers 
become aware of their own judgment and choice process.” 
(Han et al. 2007, p.162), The ATF includes two streams of 
research, the assessment of risk and the assessment of 
monetary values. In the following we focus on the 
assessment of risk. The following jump processes are 
valid:       
Individual: 
 
𝑡1 → 𝑡2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝛼𝑡1
𝑡2𝑀𝑡1 
𝑡1 → 𝑡3 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝛼𝑡1
𝑡3𝑀𝑡1 
, also for 𝑡2 and 𝑡3. 
 
Social interaction: 
 
𝑡1 + 𝑡2 → 2𝑡1 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝛼𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡1𝑡1
𝑀
𝑀𝑡1𝑀𝑡2 
𝑡1 + 𝑡2 → 2𝑡2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝛼𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡2𝑡2
𝑀
𝑀𝑡1𝑀𝑡2 
, also for 𝑡2 and 𝑡3, and 𝑡1 and 𝑡3, 
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We use the Gillespie algorithm to simulate these jump 
processes (Gillespie 1976). The number of reactions is 
assumed to be constant and is 𝜇1. There are obvious 
similarities to the models of Kirman (1993), Lux (1995) 
and De la Lama et al. (2006).   
Regarding the work of Lux (1995) we will not include a 
social temperature in which case the jump probability 
depends on the business climate index, everything one 
needs to know about such a dependency can be found in 
Lux (1995). Our theory takes the chemical kinetics as 
basis and we end with an opinion model like in Kirman 
(1993) and De la Lama et al. (2006) with its emphasis on 
social interaction. Social interaction leads to junctures in 
mutual plans and so to emotional modes, which we can’t 
depict in a model based on the business climate index. 
The decision each firm has to make is if in the next 𝜏2 
periods it shall try to innovate or to imitate. If the firm 
has made the decision, an imitation is successful with 
the probability  𝜇2 in every of the 𝜏2 periods, and the 
innovation is successful with the probability 𝜇3. If an 
imitation is successful the firms gets the best 
productivity currently on the market. A successful 
innovation leads to a stochastic variable with the 
expectation value as the current own productivity 𝐴𝑖𝑡 (see 
134 
 
Nelson und Winter 1982). We denote the productivity in 
the case of a successful imitation as 𝐴𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
max (𝐴𝑖𝑡|𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑡). The productivity of a successful 
innovation is denoted by ?̃?𝑖𝑡 und is a normally distributed 
variable wit mean 𝐴𝑖𝑡 and variance 𝜎1
2. If ?̃?𝑖𝑡 is smaller 
than 𝐴𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑖𝑡 stays as productivity. 
LeDoux (1998) concludes on page 266: “The ability to 
rapidly form memories of stimuli associated with danger, 
to hold on to them for long periods of time (perhaps 
eternally), and use them automatically when similar 
situations occur in the future is one of the brain’s most 
powerful and efficient learning and memory functions.” 
Let us go one step further. If the emotion has something 
to do with risk, what we truly believe, then it seems 
reasonable that while having an emotion we remember 
the highest loss or the highest gain. So the emotion 
becomes an extreme value and we act accordingly. The 
following sources strengthen this proposition. The 
literature on group polarization hints at the fact that 
group decisions are more extreme than the individual 
decisions. So it follows from the theory of social fear 
conditioning (Olsson und Phelps 2007) that the 
maximum emotion over the group members gets her way 
through, so that the individual decisions approach the 
most extreme one. In the game of Bechara et al. (1993) 
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we get the information that throughout the game the skin 
conductance rises, once more a clear hint that that it is 
the maximum emotion that gets her way through. 
Cambell and Jaynes (1966) show that there is a 
reinstatement of fear reactions after a burdened 
situation. Furthermore Morris and Dolan (2004) show 
that there are persistent „memories“ of the original 
conditioning. Rolls (2014) emphasizes the flexibility of 
neurons in the orbifrontal cortex after the reversal of a 
conditioning in the sense of an expected value and the 
inflexibility of neurons in the amygdala. A hint that it is 
the amygdala where the extremes lie. There is also the 
phenomenon of reconsolidation, that after a memory has 
been stored, it may be weakened or lost if recall is 
performed during the presence of a protein synthesis 
inhibitor. The brain seems capable to handle new 
information flexibly, so that it’s the biggest loss or the 
biggest gain that is remembered. There are studies that 
show that in the case of a colonoscopy people remember 
the maximum pain and the end (Ariely 1998, Fredrickson 
und Kahneman 1993, Kahneman et al. 1993, Varey und 
Kahneman 1992). Finally Lopes (1987) has found 
tendencies to focus on the “worst case” outcomes. This all 
correspondents to the idea of risk as a feeling and a 
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rudimental statistical analysis based on implicit 
memories, memories of extremes.  
One has to decide which emotion is exactly remembered. 
This could be the actual extreme value, or the extreme 
gains or losses, needing a reference point. Thirdly we 
could take the expected value and add or subtract the 
gains and losses. To be honest we can only guess which 
option is the best one, but as Kahneman (1979) 
emphasize the gains and losses in situations of risk we 
take those. The choice to take the extreme gains and 
losses increases the weight of the emotion in relation to 
the cognition with its expected value.    
The expected sales  ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 of firm i, currently following 
strategy j, is the mean of sales  𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 of the last 𝜏4 observed 
periods. It is the output of the cognition. Is the current 
result 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 bigger than the expected sales ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 and if the 
difference is bigger than the positive emotion 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , then 
this difference is equal to the new 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥. This will be 
important in good mood: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = {
𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑓𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑎𝑥  
𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
According to Lerner and Keltner (2001) the choice in a 
risky situation depends on the mood. So we can expect 
137 
 
that the decision procedure or call it appraisal differs 
dependent on the mood. The simplest procedure seems to 
be this one. In good mood the strategy j will be chosen, 
which generates the highest positive emotion 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥|𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽) 
Is the current result 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 smaller than the expected sales 
?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 and if the difference is bigger than the negative 
emotion 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑖𝑛 , then this difference is equal to the new 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛. This will be important in bad mood:                
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = {
𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡,   𝑖𝑓𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑖𝑛  
𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
Like above we take the following simple appraisal. (It is 
not an accident that it looks like the maxmin strategy 
found in game theory!) In bad mood the strategy j will be 
chosen, which generates the lowest negative emotion 
𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛|𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽) 
Emphasizing the emotion in the case of neutral mood, 
Alkahami and Slovic (1994) show that in reality there is 
not a positive correlation between the felt risk and the felt 
benefit but an inverse relationship. Moreover the 
literature on the two systems leads to the fact that 
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emotions play an important part in cognition (for example 
Carter, 1998; LeDoux, 1998, Wilson and Schooler, 1991). 
So we won’t take solely the expected value for a decision 
in neutral mood but the output of the cognition, the 
expected value, will be added to the emotions, to the 
gains and losses, to get finally two values. These both 
values, (?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥) and (?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛), have to be 
weighted, so we will take the following procedure.   
The mean range 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 equals: 
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
(?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝜆1
⁄ + (?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛)
(1 + 1 𝜆1
⁄ )
 
The gains are (?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥)−𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 and the losses are 
𝜆1[𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 − (?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛)]. So 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the point where the gains 
equal exactly the losses. This procedure allows us to 
incorporate a loss aversion parameter in our model 
(Kahneman 1979). 
In neutral mood the chosen strategy j has the highest 
mean range 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽) 
A strategy is chosen for 𝜏2 periods, whereas the positive 
and negative emotions and the mean range will be raised 
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only for the 𝜏3 last periods to prevent us from difficulties 
to which strategy an innovation respectively an imitation 
is linked after a change of strategies.  
This innovation model will be expanded by the following 
consumption model. There are O consumers. 𝑂𝐺 stands 
for the number of consumers in good mood, 𝑂𝐵 stands for 
the number of consumers in bad mood and  𝑂𝑁 stands for 
the number of consumers in neutral mood. The following 
jump processes are valid: 
Individual: 
 
𝑡1 → 𝑡2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝛽𝑡1
𝑡2𝑂𝑡1 
𝑡1 → 𝑡3 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝛽𝑡1
𝑡3𝑂𝑡1 
, also for 𝑡2 and 𝑡3. 
Social interaction: 
 
𝑡1 + 𝑡2 → 2𝑡1 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝛽𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡1𝑡1
𝑂
𝑂𝑡1𝑂𝑡2 
𝑡1 + 𝑡2 → 2𝑡2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝛽𝑡1𝑡2
𝑡2𝑡2
𝑂
𝑂𝑡1𝑂𝑡2 
, also for 𝑡2 and 𝑡3, and 𝑡1 and 𝑡3, 
140 
 
 
Once again we use the Gillespie algorithm to simulate 
these jump processes (Gillespie 1976). The number of 
reactions is assumed to be constant and is 𝜇5. 
Each firm has the following production function with 𝐿𝑖𝑡 
as number of employees: 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡 
The price of the product is a markup on the cost per part, 
with 𝑤𝑡 as wage and 𝜇6 as constant: 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 =
𝑤𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
(1 + 𝜇6) 
The wage 𝑤𝑡 increases with time, because, ignoring 
competition, we need a counterweight to the increasing 
productivity which erodes the profit of the firms because 
of the mark-up rule: 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡−1 ∗ 0,001 
Consumers who use products experience positive and 
negative surprises of utility. The difference is normally 
distributed around zero with variance 𝜎2
2. It is as if the 
felt price of the chosen product becomes higher or lower 
than the actual price. Read careful, everything is vice 
versa. The price plays now the role of the expected value 
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in the innovation model. 𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is now the negative 
emotion and not the positive one, it increases the price. 
𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛 is now the positive emotion, it reduces the price. 
Is the result of a draw 𝑥𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑛𝑑by consumer k of product l 
bigger than zero and bigger than the negative emotion 
𝐸𝑘𝑙(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑎𝑥  then this difference equals the new 𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥: 
𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = {
𝑥𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑛𝑑 ,   𝑖𝑓𝑥𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑛𝑑 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑛𝑑 > 𝐸𝑘𝑙(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑎𝑥  
𝐸𝑘𝑙(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
In bad mood the consumer k chooses the product l, 
which generates the smallest negative emotion 𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥|𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿) 
Is the result smaller than zero and is the difference 
smaller than positive emotion 𝐸𝑘𝑙(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑖𝑛  then the difference 
becomes the new 𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛:  
𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = {
𝑥𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑛𝑑 ,   𝑖𝑓𝑥𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑛𝑑 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑛𝑑 < 𝐸𝑘𝑙(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑖𝑛  
𝐸𝑘𝑙(𝑡−1)
𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
 
In good mood the consumer k chooses the product l, 
which generates the highest positive emotion 𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛|𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿) 
It’s interesting that this explains the status quo bias 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), the tendency for 
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people to prefer status quo options over other options. In 
happy mood we don’t change the status quo.  
The mean range 𝑇𝑘𝑙𝑡 equals: 
𝑇𝑘𝑙𝑡 = 𝜆2(𝑝𝑙𝑡 + 𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛) + (1 − 𝜆2)(𝑝𝑙𝑡 + 𝐸𝑘𝑙𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
With, 𝜆2 ∈ [0, … ,1].  
In neutral mood the consumer k chooses the product l, 
which generates the smallest mean range: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑇𝑘𝑙𝑡|𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿) 
In neutral mood with probability 𝜇7 the prices are 
updated and so it is a parameter for the strength of the 
price competition.  
Now let us turn to the statistics. The base case is the 
following. It is not more than a first guess. There exist 4 
firms and 600 consumers. The 𝛼′𝑠 and 𝛽′𝑠 are equal to 
0,01. 𝜇1 is 300. 𝜇2 and 𝜇3 are 0,05. 𝜇4 is 0, 𝜇5 is 8 and 𝜇6 
is equal to 0,1, 𝜇7 is 0,25. 𝜆1 is 1 and 𝜆2 is 0,5. 𝜎1
2 is 0,01, 
𝜎2
2 is equal to 21. 𝜏1 is 2000, 𝜏2 is 10, 𝜏3 is 5 and finally 𝜏4 
is 3.  
Besides, the value means accumulated profits. The 
productivity gap means the mean of the difference of the 
maximum productivity and the actual productivity of the 
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firm. We use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, with a 5% 
significance level. 
Now let’s look at the base case. At first have a look at the 
productivity and the market share for a single run (Figure 
1 and 2). We see the pattern of small stepwise 
improvements by single firms with fast imitation, which 
is quite common for Nelson-Winter type models. 
 
Figure 1: Trajectories of all four firms’ market share for a 
single run 
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Figure 2: Trajectories of all four firms’ productivity for a 
single run 
The different moods of the consumers move around 200 
as we can observe in figure 3. They never reach the 
frontiers of more than 250 respectively less than 150 
consumers with a common mood. 
 
Figure 3: Trajectories of consumers’ mood for a single run 
Before turning to emotions, let us look at the number of 
firms in good mood, with mean 1,31 and standard 
deviation of 1,01, bad mood, with mean 1,32 and 
standard deviation of 1,03, and finally neutral mood with 
mean 1,36 and standard deviation of 1,02.  
Now let’s turn to the emotions, firstly we see for firm 1 in 
figure 4 that in the beginning the positive emotion of 
innovating becomes bigger than that of imitating and 
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stays thereafter constantly above the positive emotion of 
imitating. 
 
Figure 4: Trajectories of the positive emotion of strategy 
innovate (blue) and imitate (red) of firm 1 
Secondly we see for firm 1 in figure 5 that in the 
beginning the negative emotion of innovating becomes 
bigger than the negative emotion of imitating and stays 
thereafter constantly under the negative emotion of 
imitating. So the firm 1 innovates when in good mood 
and imitates when in bad mood. 
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Figure 5: Trajectories of the negative emotion of strategy 
innovate (blue) and imitate (red) of firm 1 
Thirdly we see for firm 1 in figure 6 that the trajectories 
of the mean range move in the same direction, whereas 
the strategy to innovate seems more often to succeed. 
 
Figure 6: Trajectories of mean range of strategy innovate 
(blue) and imitate (red) of firm 1 
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Looking at the Herfindahl index in figure 7 one sees that 
frequently it is between 0,25 and 0,3 and sometimes for 
short periods above 0,3. 
 
Figure 7: Trajectory of the Herfindahl index for a single 
run 
In figure 8 one sees that the firm 3 is the winner of the 
competition, the accumulated profits are way higher than 
for the other firms. 
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Figure 8: Trajectory of the value added of all four firms 
for a single run 
In Figure 9 one sees that the price falls in the beginning, 
stays constant for 1500 periods and rises sharply in the 
last 500 periods, result of the rising wage. 
 
Figure 9: Trajectory of the price of the four firms for a 
single run 
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Last but not least we look at the trajectories of profit and 
sales, with the same pattern as the development of the 
market share in figure 1. 
 
Figure 10: Trajectory of the profit of the four firms for a 
single run 
 
Figure 11: Trajectory of the sales of the four firms for a 
single run 
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T9 (base case): 
We see in table 9a that the average price and its slope 
increase. The reason we see such increase is that the 
wage increases and this increase leads to an increase in 
profit because of the mark-up rule. Ignoring the 
competition the productivity drives the profit down, but 
the wage drives it up. Lastly this results in an increasing 
profit which can be seen. In table 9b Im/In means that 
the agent imitates in good mood and innovates in bad 
mood, In/Im means that she innovates in good mood and 
imitates in bad, Im/Im means that she imitates in both 
moods and finally In/In means that she innovates in both 
moods. Moreover we see that the distribution of agents 
seems rather stable. Besides, the case, that there is no 
change of emotion after period 500, appears 24 times, 
while in 56 cases there is such a change.  
In this base case we see in table 9b that the innovation in 
both moods dominates the picture, while especially the 
later the time, while the agents who innovate in good 
mood and imitate in bad mood dominate in the early 
phase. In table 9c we see that the profit and value is not 
significantly different between agents In/In and the other 
three types of agents, but the productivity and sales are 
significantly smaller in the case of In/In. 
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T11: 
T11 means compared to the base case an increase of the 
loss aversion parameter 𝜆1 to 10. 
We see in table 11a the same picture like earlier. The 
average profit increases despite the increase of the 
average productivity, a result of the increasing wage. 
Comparing this case with the base case we see in table 
22 that its average productivity and the maximum 
productivity is significantly smaller, its herfindahl index 
is significantly smaller and finally the average profit and 
the average price are significantly higher. The 
distribution of agents over the whole period is rather 
stable. But here the agents who innovate in good mood 
and imitate in bad moods (In/Im) dominate the picture 
not the In/In type. Nearly half of the population consists 
of the type In/Im. While the profit of the In/In type isn’t 
significantly smaller, the value, the productivity, the sales 
and the market share are. In the case of Im/Im only the 
value is significantly smaller. 
What is happening here is that, because of the higher 
loss aversion, the agents act in the neutral mood like in 
the bad mood and because in bad mood the imitation 
dominates there is more imitation and less innovation so 
we get this picture. 
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T12: 
T12 means compared to the base case an increase of the 
imitation probability 𝜇2 to 0,15. 
Now let’s come to the case with higher imitation 
probability. The average profit rises, like the average 
productivity and the average price. Not new to us. In 
comparison to the base case we see the following. The 
average and the maximum productivity are significantly 
higher, its herfindahl index is significantly smaller and 
the average profit and price are significantly smaller. 
Moreover we see once again that the distribution of 
agents is rather stable. In contrast to the base case the 
type In/Im clearly dominates and we see less agents of 
the In/In type, consistent with a higher imitation 
probability. Looking at the statistics for the different 
types of agents we see the known picture. The profit of 
the In/In type is significantly smaller than the profit of 
the In/Im type but its value is not. The productivity and 
the sales and the market share are significantly smaller, 
the price obviously higher. 
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T14: 
T14 means compared to the base case an increase of the 
innovation probability 𝜇3 to 0,15. 
The development of the average price, the average 
productivity and the average profit is equal to the cases 
above. The average and maximum productivity is 
significantly higher than in the base case, the herfindahl 
index is significantly higher, the consumption and 
productivity gap is significantly smaller, the average 
profit and price are significantly smaller. The distribution 
of the agent types is very similar to the base case, but 
there are more agents of the type Im/Im. Although the 
sales are significantly less and the price is significantly 
higher the profit and value are not significantly different, 
comparing the type Im/Im with type In/Im. Furthermore 
although the innovation probability rises the type In/In 
in comparison to the type In/Im has significantly less 
profit and value. 
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T15: 
T15 means that the mood of the consumers doesn’t 
change and stays good.  
The herfindahl index is significantly smaller, the 
consumption and productivity gap are bigger than in the 
base case. The distribution of agents is stable, but gives a 
very different picture. The pure types Im/Im and In/In 
clearly dominate the picture. And both types don’t differ 
significantly in their profit, value, productivity, sales, 
price and finally their market share. 
What is happening in this case? At the beginning of the 
run we can observe the following. If there is a jump in the 
productivity this means in the case T15 that the profit 
erodes, the market share stays the same forever. But the 
negative jump of profit is higher the earlier we look at it. 
So if the first jump occurs while being an imitator in bad 
mood the agent changes to an innovator strategy, but the 
next changes in profit because of a rising productivity will 
all be smaller than the first one. So we get an innovator 
in bad mood. But the more times we are in a bad mood, 
the higher gets the probability of a rising profit because of 
a rising wage. So finally we get an innovator in bad and 
good mood.     
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T16: 
T16 means that the mood of the consumers doesn’t 
change and stays bad.  
Comparing the dynamics of the average price, average 
productivity and average profit we get the same picture as 
before. Comparing T16 with the base case the only thing 
we can mention is that the herfindahl index is 
significantly smaller; all other numbers aren’t 
significantly different. The distribution of agents looks 
very different. There are by far more types Im/Im and 
Im/In, which seems a logical consequence of the 
probability structure. A jump in profit is a result of 
chance and not of a higher productivity. Comparing the 
different types of agents, we can say the following. While 
the sales are significantly higher for In/Im and Im/Im 
compared to In/In, all the other numbers aren’t 
significantly different. But the numbers of Im/In are 
quite differently compared to In/In. The profit and value 
are significantly smaller, while the productivity and price 
are significantly higher.   
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T17: 
T17 means that the mood of the consumers doesn’t 
change and stays neutral.  
In comparison with the base case we can say the 
following. The average and maximum productivity are 
significantly higher, the herfindahl index is significantly 
higher, the consumption gap is significantly smaller and 
the average profit and price is significantly smaller. 
Looking at the distribution of agents, we can observe a 
change from the dominant In/Im to the type In/In from 
the first periods to the period 2000. Comparing Im/Im 
with In/Im the productivity is significantly smaller, the 
price significantly higher and the market share 
significantly smaller. Last but not least the profit and 
value are significantly smaller in the case of In/In 
compared with In/Im, the productivity, the sales and the 
market share are significantly smaller, the price is 
significantly higher. 
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T18: 
T18 means that the mood of the firms doesn’t change and 
stays good.  
Compared to the base case the average and maximum 
productivity are significantly smaller, like the herfindahl 
index. The average profit is significantly higher and the 
average price also. The distribution of agents is stable. 
Chance leads in the beginning to an innovation or 
imitation strategy and because the agent is always in a 
good mood the strategy doesn’t change. But the losses 
with this strategy become higher and higher with time, so 
an agent who is an innovator in good mood becomes an 
imitator in bad mood leading to the type In/Im. 
Comparing the type Im/In with In/Im we see that the 
productivity and the sales and the market share are 
significantly higher. 
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T19: 
T19 means that the mood of the firms doesn’t change and 
stays bad.  
Compared to the base case in the case T19 the average 
and maximum productivity is significantly smaller, the 
average profit is significantly higher. Looking at the 
dynamics of the distribution of agents we see that the 
type In/Im rises until period 1500 while thereafter its 
number declines. Contrary the type In/In rises by 10 
from period 1500 to 2000. The profit and value of type 
In/Im are significantly higher than of type In/In, the 
sales and the market share are significantly higher.  
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T20: 
T20 means that the mood of the firms doesn’t change and 
stays neutral.  
The comparison of case T20 to the base case shows only 
that the herfindahl index is significantly smaller, while all 
other numbers are not significantly different. The 
distribution of agents is rather stable, the only thing one 
notices is the increase of type Im/In and that the 
distribution is very similar to T18. The profit and value of 
type In/Im are significantly smaller than of the type 
Im/In, the productivity is significantly higher and the 
price significantly smaller. One can observe cases where 
there are only imitators with very good results for type 
Im/In, this seems the reason for the significantly 
different results. Moreover one can explain the similarity 
to case T18. For example after some bad draws the agent 
chooses innovation as strategy, but if the condition gets 
better the agent stays with this strategy as long as the 
condition gets worse than the first time. So one can 
observe that after some time the agents don’t change 
their strategy just like in the case T18. 
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T21: 
T21 means that the firms change their strategies 
randomly, with equal chance of an imitation or an 
innovation strategy. 
In this random strategy case one can see that the average 
and maximum productivity are significantly higher, the 
herfindahl index is significantly smaller, the consumption 
and productivity gap are significantly smaller, and the 
average profit and the price are significantly smaller. 
 
T10: 
T10 means that the firms choose their strategy according 
to the higher mean ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 ignoring emotions completely. 
This case shows that the average and maximum 
productivity are significantly smaller, the average profit 
and price are significantly higher than in the base case. 
 
T13:  
T13 means that the firms choose the imitation strategy 
whenever the difference between the maximum 
productivity and the firm’s productivity is higher than 
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0,0398, the expected increase of the innovation strategy, 
ignoring any price effects. 
This case shows that the average and maximum 
productivity are significantly higher, the herfindahl index 
is significantly smaller, the consumption and productivity 
gap are significantly smaller, and the average profit and 
the price are significantly smaller. 
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Discussion 
We see that the whole model is very stable and acts like it 
should in the case of higher risk aversion, higher 
imitation probability and higher innovation probability.  
Emotions will act positively on the stability of the 
economy, if the following picture is true. To cite again 
LeDoux (1998): „From the point of view of survival, it is 
better to respond to potentially dangerous events as if 
they were in fact the real thing than to fail to respond. 
The cost of treating a stick as a snake is less, in the long 
run, than the cost of treating a snake as a stick.“ 
Strategies which are too risky in relation to their chances 
will be abandoned more quickly than in the case without 
emotion. So emotions can be a tool to survive in a risky 
environment and so a tool for stability.  
But the introduction of emotions has come with a 
problem, the moods. If we look at depressed people and 
people with bipolar disturbances we can imagine the dark 
side of the emotion. The people don’t act no more as 
maximizer’s of the expected value but focus completely 
on risk or chance, leading to enormous problems. Often 
depressed people stay the whole day in bed. In our 
theoretical framework this is the result of the maxmin 
strategy in bad mood. The illness has serious 
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consequences on the whole social life of those depressed 
people. Moreover people with bipolar disturbances show 
depressed behavior alternated with episodes full of risky 
behavior. This fits our framework if we look at good 
moods. Those in good moods use the maxmax strategy 
and focus completely on chances without looking at the 
bad side. If we look at the economy episodes of 
depression have also enormous problems, high 
unemployment and political problems.  
So summing up the introduction of moods seems to have 
in reality obviously negative consequences for the 
individual and the economy as a whole. Justified can its 
introduction only be by the introduction of emotions in 
neutral mood which can stabilize the economy and the 
personal decisions. So there seems to exist a trade-off, 
more stability and better results in neutral mood and less 
stability and suboptimal choices in good and bad moods. 
So let’s take a look if our model can lead to some 
answers. 
Besides in the case of no emotion the firms try to 
maximize their expected value, with a probability of 
12,5% to change to the worse strategy for an updating, 
and consumers try to maximize their stochastic utility 
described in the above model. The expected sales  ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝑡 of 
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firm i, currently following strategy j, is the mean of sales  
𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 of the last 𝜏4 observed periods. It is the output of the 
cognition. Consumers who use products experience 
positive and negative surprises of utility. The difference is 
normally distributed around zero with variance 𝜎2
2. It is 
as if the felt price of the chosen product becomes higher 
or lower than the actual price.  
Now let’s turn to the results of table 23. The average 
productivity is smaller in the case of constant good mood 
(T18), constant bad mood (T19) or in the case of constant 
neutral mood (T20) than in the case of no emotion, but 
not significantly different from the average productivity in 
case T9. So the melting of the three moods in one model 
(T9) leads to an insignificant result. The maxmax and 
maxmin strategies in the case of T18 and T19 lead to less 
changes of strategy as in the case of no emotion and so 
the significantly higher prices. If we look at the herfindahl 
index it is bigger in the case of T18 and smaller in T19 
and T20. The average profit is in the cases T18, T19 and 
T20 bigger than in the case of no emotion and the 
average price is significantly higher, but not in the base 
case T9, there the average profit and average price are 
indifferent between the case T9 and the case of no 
emotion.  
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Looking at the case where there is no emotion for the firm 
(it follows its expected value) and full emotion for the 
consumers (T26), as in the base case T9, we get the 
following picture for T26. The average productivity is 
significantly higher, the herfindahl index is significantly 
smaller, the productivity gap is significantly smaller, the 
average profit is significantly smaller like the average 
price and the maximum productivity is significantly 
higher than in the case of no emotion.    
So having emotions seems to be quiet advantageous for 
the consumers, if one compares it with the case of no 
emotion on both sides. But in the moment we include 
additionally emotions for the firm, looking especially at 
T20, the picture changes. The advantage lies then on the 
side of the firm and no more on the consumer’s side, the 
average profit and price become significantly higher. But 
if we include moods the advantage on side of the firm 
vanishes and we are left with insignificant results for T9 
vs. the case of no emotion. This is quiet what one would 
have expected after the initial discussion.  
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av. prod herfindahl prod. Gap av profit av.price max. prod 
Tab 9 n.s. n.s. > n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Tab 18 < > > > > < 
Tab 19 < < n.s. > > < 
Tab 20 < < n.s. > > n.s. 
Tab 26 > < < < < > 
 
Tab.23    Tabx vs. no emotion (10% level), Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 
Now let us turn to the case (T27) and to table 24 where 
the firms have full emotion, like in case T9, and the 
consumers have none and maximize their stochastic 
utility. The table 24 shows that only the herfindahl index 
is significantly lower than in the case of no emotion all 
other indicators don’t differ significantly. We would have 
expected here that the average profit and price are 
significantly higher but this does not materialize. Looking 
at T17, with basic emotions on the consumers side we get 
what we expected. The average productivity is 
significantly higher, the average profit and price are 
significantly smaller. The cases where the consumers are 
in a constant good mood or in a constant bad mood leave 
us with worse results, the key indicators are all not 
significantly different from the case of no emotion, so that 
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was expected. The melting of both moods with the 
emotion in neutral mood, case T9, leads also to non 
significant results, what was expected.        
 
 
 
av. prod herfindahl prod. Gap av profit av.price max. prod 
Tab 15 n.s. < > n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Tab 16 n.s. < n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Tab 17 > > n.s. < < > 
Tab 27 n.s. < n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
 
Tab.24    Tabx vs. no emotion (10% level), Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 
 
So let us turn now to the confidence intervals and let us 
explore what we can learn about them. We have only data 
for the periods 500, 1000, 1500 and 2000. The upper 
band is green, the mean blue and the lower band is red. 
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Figure 12: the development of the average price with its 
confidence interval (90%) (no emotion) 
 
Figure 13: the development of the average price with its 
confidence interval (90%) (base case T9) 
If we look at the average price we can see that the upper 
band of the base case T9 lies constantly above the upper 
band in the case of no emotion. For the lower band two 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
169 
 
out of four values lie under the lower band of the case 
with no emotion. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: the development of the average price with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T26) 
If we look at the lower band in case T26 we see that it is 
nearly the same than in the case of no emotion. The 
upper band is in three out of four cases smaller than in 
the case of no emotion.  
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Figure 15: the development of the average price with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T20) 
The upper band of the price in the case T20 lies 
constantly above the upper band in case of no emotion. 
The lower band values for the case T20 are in the cases 
1000, 1500 and 2000 bigger than in the case with no 
emotion. The development of the upper band becomes 
understandable if one notices that in the case T20 one 
can observe cases where there are only imitators leading 
to very high prices. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
171 
 
 
Figure 16: the development of the price with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T18) 
Looking at the upper band of the price in T18 the values 
of the upper band lie above those in the case of no 
emotion. The lower band values for the case T18 are in 
the cases 1000, 1500 and 2000 bigger than in the case 
with no emotion. 
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Figure 17: the development of the price with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T19) 
The upper band of the price in the case T19 lies 
constantly above the upper band in case of no emotion. 
The lower band values for the case T19 are in the periods 
1000, 1500 and 2000 bigger than in the case with no 
emotion. 
So looking at the average price one gets bad news for the 
consumers if one incorporates emotions. The upper band 
of the cases T18, T19 and T20 lies constantly above the 
upper band of the case with no emotion. Furthermore in 
the mentioned cases in the periods 1000, 1500 and 2000 
the values of the lower band are bigger than in the case 
of no emotion. The situation is somewhat better in the 
case T9, where for the lower band we have only two 
values which are higher than in the case of no emotion. 
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Figure 18: the development of the average profit with its 
confidence interval (90%) (no emotion) 
 
Figure 19: the development of the average profit with its 
confidence interval (90%) (base case T9) 
The upper band of the average profit in the case T9 is 
bigger than in the case of no emotion, but the lower band 
is only in period 2000 bigger otherwise smaller. 
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Figure 20: the development of the average profit with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T26) 
The lower band in case T26 is nearly the same as the 
lower band in the case of no emotion. The upper band is 
in periods 1000, 1500 and 2000 smaller than in the case 
of no emotion. 
 
Figure 21: the development of the average profit with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T20) 
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The upper band of the average profit is in case T20 
constantly bigger than in the case of no emotion. The 
lower band in case T20 lies from period 1000 constantly 
above the lower band in the case of no emotion. This fits 
well the theory developed before. The development of the 
upper band becomes understandable if one notices that 
in the case T20 one can observe cases where there are 
only imitators leading to very high profit. 
 
Figure 22: the development of the average profit with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T18) 
The upper band in the case T18, looking at average 
profits, lies constantly above the upper band in the case 
of no emotion. The lower band of case T18 lies in periods 
1000, 1500 and 2000 above the lower band in the case of 
no emotion. So choosing the alternative with the highest 
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chance (maxmax strategy) leads also to favorable values 
for the lower band. 
 
 
Figure 23: the development of the average profit with its 
confidence interval (90%) (T19) 
From period 1000 onward the lower band of the case T19 
lies above the lower band in the case of no emotion, 
which is not surprising because of the use of the maxmin 
strategy. Further looking at the average profit the upper 
band of case T19 lies constantly above the upper band in 
the case of no emotion. So choosing the alternative with 
the lowest risk (maxmin strategy) leads also to favorable 
values for the upper band. 
Investigating the average profits we get the following 
picture. Without positive and negative moods (case T20) 
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the inclusion of emotions leads to favorable results. If we 
look at the case T18 respectively T19 they also lead to 
favorable results comparing them to the case with no 
emotion. But the melting of the three moods in one model 
(T9) leads not to favorable results looking at the lower 
band, but only if we look at the upper band. In three 
cases (500, 1000, 1500) the lower band is lower in the 
case T9 compared to no emotions.  
Our model hints moreover at the fact that emotions can 
lead to serious problems in asset markets. If all the 
market participants look for the same “safe harbor” there 
will be heavy problems if this “safe harbor” becomes 
risky. This happens if the asset, which is seen as safe by 
most participants, reaches a negative extreme (emotion) 
which is more negative than all the other assets in the 
short list of the investors. Suddenly after the shock all 
the market participants who are in bad mood will switch 
their strategy, leading to panic and jumps in the prices 
for those assets and sometimes to complete market 
breakdowns. On the other side if an asset becomes a 
chance, because the asset reaches a positive extreme, 
there will be a flow in from all the participants in good 
mood whose positive extreme in their short list is lower. 
Suddenly after this positive shock there will be a switch 
by those participants leading to a positive jump in the 
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price for that asset. So moods can obviously lead to a 
destabilization of asset markets.  
Now let’s look how we can include such problems in our 
model. We call it an emotional shock if a negative 
emotion in one period of a firm is more negative than all 
other negative emotions of that firm and the other firms 
looking at that particular strategy. In this case there will 
be a chance of 50% that all the firms in the market will 
overtake the negative emotion of that strategy. We 
include the emotional shock in the base model. 
 
 
av. prod herfindahl prod. Gap av profit av.price max. prod 
Tab Schock n.s. < n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. 
 
Tab.25  emotional shock vs. no emotion (10% level), Wilcoxon signed-
rank test 
 
So according to table 24 the inclusion of an emotional 
shock leads not to significant results at the 10% level, 
comparing it with the case of no emotion. We would have 
expected a better result for the firms because of cases 
where all firms become suddenly imitators, but this 
didn’t materialize. 
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We now turn to the consumption side and to the results 
of table 25. Like above we take T9 as basis and include 
the following emotional shock. A negative emotion in one 
period of a consumer is more negative than all other 
negative emotions of that consumer and the other 
consumers for that particular product. In this case there 
will be a chance of 50% that all the consumers in the 
market will overtake the negative emotion of that 
strategy.  
This second inclusion of an emotional shock leads mostly 
to insignificant results comparing it with the case of no 
emotion. So summing up there is no simple answer what 
the inclusion of emotions will lead to, one has to carefully 
analyze each case. 
 
 
av. prod herfindahl prod. Gap av profit av.price max. prod 
Tab Schock 2 n.s. > n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
 
Tab.26   emotional shock 2 vs. no emotion (10% level), Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test 
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Conclusion 
So what can we finally learn from our model? We can 
learn what an emotion in an economic model can look 
like. Simply speaking in a wider sense it is an appraisal 
mechanism with a specific goal and with extremes as 
input. We have distinguished three goals: minimizing the 
risk, maximizing the chance and maximizing the 
midrange. This has led to the inclusion of moods which 
specify which goal has priority. Moods can be modeled as 
stochastic jump processes as we have argued. So 
building on the work of so many we achieved an 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms when we 
talk about an emotion. This knowledge made it possible 
to build an economic model based on Schumpeterian 
competition including emotions. These experiments 
resulted firstly in the findings how the number of 
different types of agents, according how they react in bad 
and good mood, developed in different environments 
compared to a base case and how they differ. We saw 
that innovation in good mood and imitation in bad mood 
dominates in many environments, followed by innovation 
in both moods. Secondly we compared cases with no 
emotion and cases with emotion leading to the findings 
that the cases with emotion are better or insignificant, 
strengthening our position of valuable emotions.   
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
172  
(33) 
183  
(26) 
231  
(35) 
303 
(42) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,17 
(0,39) 
3,32 
(0,49) 
4,37 
(0,69) 
5,45 
(0,75) 
Av. profit 2314 
(435) 
2473 
(351) 
3113 
(489) 
4099 
(557) 
Tab.9a (in parentheses standard deviation) 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 11 5 6 14 
In/Im 34 34 39 26 
Im/Im 16 16 12 10 
In/In 19 25 23 30 
Tab.9b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 4123 
(1977) 
4101 
(1524) 
3808 
(4183) 
4183 
(2020) 
value 5743662 
(617254) 
5723318 
(900909) 
5624210 
(1178478) 
5442362 
(1093437) 
productivity 5,36 
(0,54) 
5,67 
(0,86) 
5,9  
(0,84) 
5,16 
(0,64) 
sales 306345 
(22616) 
307828 
(18429) 
314709 
(28452) 
285074 
(51909) 
price 306 (33) 293 (49) 280 (45) 319 (38) 
market 
share 
0,249 
(0,12) 
0,256 
(0,08) 
0,252 
(0,06) 
0,243 
(0,12) 
Tab.9c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
Im/In   n.s.  n.s.       >    >  n.s.   n.s. 
In/Im   n.s.  n.s.       >    >    <    > 
Im/Im   n.s.  n.s.       >    >    <   n.s. 
Tab.9d Im/In vs. In/In; In/Im vs. In/In; Im/Im vs. In/In 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
180  
(26) 
194  
(24) 
242  
(25) 
325  
(27) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,05 
(0,29) 
3,12  
(0,4) 
4,11 
(0,46) 
5,04 
(0,47) 
Av. profit 2437 
(358) 
2625 
(319) 
3282 
(335) 
4401 
(368) 
Tab.11a 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 4 6 3 7 
In/Im 36 42 35 39 
Im/Im 20 12 21 16 
In/In 20 20 21 18 
Tab.11b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 4294 
(1555) 
4430 
(984) 
4362 
(576) 
4316 
(1869) 
value 5753207 
(745105) 
618420 
(643048) 
5787305 
(762116) 
5442568 
(590411) 
productivity 5,02 
(0,54) 
5,04 
(0,41) 
5,22 
(0,55) 
4,88 
(0,67) 
sales 290318 
(32171) 
308600 
(24997) 
306715 
(22497) 
278164 
(39274) 
price 326 (33) 323 (23) 313 (30) 338 (43) 
market 
share 
0,246 
(0,1) 
0,251 
(0,05) 
0,261 
(0,02) 
0,237 
(0,11) 
Tab.11c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
In/In   n.s.    <           <    <   n.s.     < 
Im/Im   n.s.    <         n.s.   n.s.   n.s.    n.s. 
Tab.11d In/In vs. In/Im; Im/Im vs. In/Im 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
158  
(24) 
161  
(20) 
202  
(26) 
271  
(26) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,35 
(0,38) 
3,76 
(0,45) 
4,95 
(0,63) 
6,1  
(0,83) 
Av. profit 2136 
(329) 
2187 
(267) 
2739 
(358) 
3670 
(495) 
Tab.12a 
    
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 12 4 3 4 
In/Im 43 50 47 43 
Im/Im 10 12 11 10 
In/In 15 14 19 23 
Tab.12b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 4335 
(880) 
3748 
(860) 
3748 
(774) 
3376 
(1040) 
value 5587740 
(883282) 
5040868 
(564888) 
5465459 
(921386) 
4849697 
(723759) 
productivity 6,01 (0,8) 6,4 (0,87) 6,04 (0,8) 5,59 
(0,73) 
sales 322506 
(30590) 
306308 
(18631) 
319610 
(25293) 
275769 
(36677) 
price 273 (32) 258 (36) 273 (38) 295 (40) 
market 
share 
0,292 
(0,05) 
0,266 
(0,05) 
0,251 
(0,03) 
0,211 
(0,06) 
Tab.12c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
In/In    <  n.s.           <    <    >     < 
Im/Im   n.s.  n.s.         n.s.   n.s.   n.s.    n.s. 
Tab.12d In/In vs. In/Im; Im/Im vs. In/Im 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
85  
(10) 
80  
(7) 
90  
(6) 
115  
(7) 
Av. 
productivity 
4,32 
(0,55) 
7,53 
(0,72) 
10,92 
(0,81) 
14,19  
(1) 
Av. profit 1156 
(146) 
1086 
(107) 
1231  
(86) 
1561 
(103) 
Tab.14a 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 9 8 8 6 
In/Im 31 31 33 30 
Im/Im 16 16 16 18 
In/In 24 25 23 26 
Tab.14b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 1637 
(282) 
1622 
(272) 
1574 
(155) 
1464 
(289) 
value 2630438 
(318316) 
2742262 
(269031) 
2723993 
(154472) 
2493885 
(304267) 
productivity 14,72 
(1,52) 
14,46 
(1,03) 
14,04 
(0,79) 
13,87 
(1,5) 
sales 307169 
(19970) 
313567 
(15831) 
303407 
(14222) 
280334 
(42455) 
price 108 (10) 112 (7) 116 (6) 118 (12) 
market 
share 
0,271 
(0,04 
0,263 
(0,03) 
0,249 
(0,02) 
0,23 
(0,05) 
Tab. 14c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
In/In    <    <           <    <    >     < 
Im/Im   n.s.  n.s.         n.s.    <    >    n.s. 
Tab.14d In/In vs. In/Im; Im/Im vs. In/Im 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
164 (19) 182 (18) 225 (30) 297 (39) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,23 
(0,27) 
3,32 
(0,32) 
4,46 
(0,54) 
5,55 
(0,65)  
Av. profit 2247 
(261) 
2480 
(253) 
3067 
(412) 
4058 
(538) 
Tab.15a 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 17 9 6 5 
In/Im 10 8 8 5 
Im/Im 19 23 25 27 
In/In 34 40 41 43 
Tab.15b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 3549 
(494) 
3343 
(376) 
4130 
(661) 
4154 
(591) 
value 5481487 
(482838) 
5180904 
(452771) 
5545131 
(618969) 
5551098 
(686045) 
productivity 6,23 
(0,78) 
6,41 (0,5) 6,32 
(0,74) 
5,4 (0,65) 
sales 296543 
(19687) 
288914 
(20882) 
302919 
(12927) 
299859 
(22387) 
price 263 (35) 254 (21) 300 (49) 305 (39) 
market 
share 
0,247 
(0,01) 
0,24 
(0,01) 
0,252 
(0,01) 
0,249 
(0,01) 
Tab. 15c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
Im/Im    n.s.   n.s.        n.s.    n.s.   n.s.   n.s. 
Tab.15d Im/Im vs. In/In 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
164  
(22) 
178  
(22) 
221  
(22) 
292  
(27) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,25 
(0,31) 
3,41 
(0,38) 
4,51 
(0,45) 
5,61 
(0,52) 
Av. profit 2243 
(314) 
2436 
(302) 
3022 
(305) 
3991 
(373) 
Tab.16a 
 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 13 12 13 15 
In/Im 19 15 14 11 
Im/Im 22 23 24 26 
In/In 26 30 29 28 
Tab.16b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im 
/Im 
In/In 
profit 3620 
(284) 
3909 
(520) 
4112 
(541) 
4109 
(649) 
value 5133741 
(374116) 
5633139 
(464388) 
5456752 
(561272) 
5570042 
(623317) 
productivity 6,03 
(0,56) 
5,76 
(0,52) 
5,51 
(0,55) 
5,44 
(0,64) 
sales 297505 
(10205) 
305039 
(10251) 
303143 
(8664) 
296440 
(9865) 
price 272 (25) 283 (26) 297 (30) 302 (38) 
market 
share 
0,243 
(0,01) 
0,252 
(0,02) 
0,253 
(0,02) 
0,25 
(0,02) 
Tab. 16c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
Im/In     <    <       >   n.s.    <   n.s. 
In/Im   n.s.  n.s.      n.s.    >   n.s.   n.s. 
Im/Im   n.s.  n.s.      n.s.    >   n.s.   n.s. 
Tab.16d Im/In vs. In/In; In/Im vs. In/In; Im/Im vs. In/In 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
153  
(25) 
165  
(22) 
204  
(24) 
269  
(42) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,43 
(0,41) 
3,69 
(0,51) 
4,88 
(0,58) 
6,14 
(0,75) 
Av. profit 2056 
(335) 
2212 
(294) 
2750 
(340) 
3615 
(604) 
Tab. 17a 
 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 5 5 7 3 
In/Im 47 50 51 41 
Im/Im 19 17 14 17 
In/In 9 8 8 19 
Tab.17b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 
 
 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 2514 
(2187) 
4361 
(2156) 
4025 
(1658) 
1813 
(2583) 
value 5257275 
(1638742) 
5237034 
(1181329) 
4990267 
(1080791) 
4056661 
(2050446) 
productivity 6,18 
(0,63) 
6,4 (0,52) 5,67 
(1,17) 
5,98 
(0,68) 
sales 296947 
(83727) 
327473 
(59721) 
293634 
(50813) 
246997 
(112993) 
price 264 (28) 255 (21) 300 (75) 274 (31) 
market 
share 
0,185 
(0,16) 
0,318 
(0,15) 
0,241 
(0,077) 
0,125 
(0,17) 
Tab.17c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
Im/Im  n.s.   n.s.           <   n.s.    >     < 
In/In    <    <          <    <    >     < 
Tab.17d Im/Im vs. In/Im; In/In vs. In/Im 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
170  
(24) 
193  
(23) 
240  
(23) 
322  
(26) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,19 
(0,29) 
3,15 
(0,36) 
4,14 
(0,38) 
5,08 
(0,43) 
Av. profit 2283 
(331) 
2599 
(324) 
3243 
(330) 
4354 
(367) 
Tab. 18a 
 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 37 38 38 38 
In/Im 40 40 41 40 
Im/Im 2 1 1 1 
In/In 1 1 0 1 
Tab.18b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 4397 
(678) 
4264 
(1346) 
3901 
(n.a.) 
6784 
(n.a.) 
value 5799735 
(560861) 
5672532 
(1022029) 
8179665 
(n.a.) 
6197748 
(n.a.) 
productivity 5,2 (0,46) 4,99 
(0,53) 
4,16 
(n.a.) 
4,8 (n.a.) 
sales 308856 
(15580) 
289685 
(60379) 
329709 
(n.a.) 
346425 
(n.a.) 
price 314 (27) 328 (35) 390 (n.a.) 337 (n.a.) 
market 
share 
0,256 
(0,03) 
0,242 
(0,08) 
0,183 
(n.a.) 
0,36 
(n.a.) 
Tab.18c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
Im/In    n.s.   n.s.         >     >   n.s.    > 
Tab.18d Im/In vs. In/Im 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
181  
(27) 
217  
(37) 
279  
(52) 
373  
(72) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,04 
(0,32) 
2,83 
(0,48) 
3,66 
(0,68) 
4,49 
(0,79) 
Av. profit 2447 
(364) 
2939 
(515) 
3766 
(715) 
5043 
(981) 
Tab.19a 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 10 2 4 6 
In/Im 28 33 37 29 
Im/Im 14 10 6 2 
In/In 28 35 33 43 
Tab.19b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 3619 
(707) 
5560 
(1107) 
7345 
(2117) 
4785 
(2169) 
value 6015461 
(452318) 
6863512 
(994859) 
8044221 
(67534) 
6209558 
(111265) 
productivity 4,66 
(0,71) 
4,55 
(0,85) 
3,57 
(1,01) 
4,47 (0,8) 
sales 298737 
(34452) 
311086 
(29768) 
330475 
(37351) 
291283 
(30397) 
price 354 (51) 369 (72) 451 (102) 374 (73) 
market 
share 
0,193 
(0,06) 
0,28 
(0,04) 
0,28 
(0,00) 
0,235 
(0,09) 
Tab.19c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
In/Im    >     >        n.s.     >   n.s.     > 
Tab.19d In/Im vs. In/In 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
191  
(59) 
241  
(124) 
336  
(228) 
492  
(404) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,03 
(0,46) 
2,9  
(0,91) 
3,73 
(1,32) 
4,57 
(1,72) 
Av. profit 2591 
(824) 
3259 
(1705) 
4552 
(3141) 
6672 
(5540) 
Tab. 20a 
 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Im/In 34 32 39 41 
In/Im 32 29 28 31 
Im/Im 3 4 2 1 
In/In 11 15 11 7 
Tab.20b 
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 Im/In In/Im Im/Im In/In 
profit 9099 
(6820) 
4154 
(1137) 
3577 
(n.a.) 
4054 
(1334) 
value 9214155 
(5028586) 
5606633 
(1056731) 
5810160 
(735028) 
5511881 
(1375210) 
productivity 3,81 
(2,07) 
5,3 (0,73) 6,64 
(n.a.) 
5,26 (0,9) 
sales 304864 
(17519) 
295659 
(52811) 
320928 
(n.a.) 
287750 
(44163) 
price 663 (498) 313 (47) 244 (n.a.) 317 (59) 
market 
share 
0,254 
(0,03) 
0,247 
(0,07) 
0,268 
(n.a.) 
0,235 
(0,06) 
Tab.20c 
 
 profit value productivity sales price market 
share 
In/Im    <     <          >   n.s.     <    n.s. 
Tab.20d In/Im vs. Im/In 
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 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
209  
(58) 
257  
(126) 
353  
(234) 
507  
(416) 
Av. 
productivity 
1,84 
(0,39) 
2,68 
(0,79) 
3,47 
(1,13) 
4,31 
(1,47) 
Av. profit 2812 
(824) 
3469 
(1741) 
4778 
(3221) 
6864 
(5708) 
Tab. 10 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
98  
(17) 
88  
(11) 
105  
(13) 
131  
(14) 
Av. 
productivity 
3,8  
(0,63) 
6,82 
(0,83) 
9,5  
(1,15) 
12,42 
(1,22) 
Av. profit 1337 
(244) 
1212 
(157) 
1433 
(179) 
1799 
(193) 
Tab. 13 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
143  
(17) 
144  
(15) 
174  
(14) 
219  
(14) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,55  
(0,3) 
4,19 
(0,46) 
5,69  
(0,48) 
7,41 
(0,49) 
Av. profit 1956 
(230) 
1961 
(209) 
2372 
(203) 
2994 
(193) 
Tab.21 
203 
 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
168  
(19) 
182  
(20) 
223  
(26) 
293 
(32) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,17 
(0,26) 
3,31 
(0,37) 
4,46 
(0,54) 
5,6 
 (0,65) 
Av. profit 2294 
(270) 
2487 
(283) 
3050 
(358) 
4003 
(445) 
Tab.27 (no emotion) (in parentheses standard deviation) 
 500 1000 1500 2000 
Av. price 
 
166  
(22) 
169  
(18) 
208  
(21) 
271 
(23) 
Av. 
productivity 
2,22 
(0,30) 
3,56 
(0,37) 
4,77 
(0,48) 
6,03 
 (0,50) 
Av. profit 2238 
(288) 
2299 
(259) 
2827 
(296) 
3690 
(314) 
Tab.28 (firm has no emotion, consumers possess full 
emotion (T26)) 
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av. prod herfindahl prod. Gap av profit av.price max. prod 
Tab 10 < < n.s. > > < 
Tab 11 < < n.s. > > < 
Tab 12 > < n.s. < < > 
Tab 13 > < < < < > 
Tab 14 > > < < < > 
Tab 15 n.s. < > n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Tab 16 n.s. < n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Tab 17 > > n.s. < < > 
Tab 18 < < n.s. > > < 
Tab 19 < n.s. n.s. > > < 
Tab 20 n.s. < n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Tab 21 > < < < < > 
 
Tab.22    Tx vs. base case (5% level), Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
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